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NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
Latin American Financing
MR. WELLINGTON: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'm Harry
Wellington, and I'm the Dean of the New York Law School, and it is a
great pleasure to welcome you here this afternoon. This is the fourth
symposium of our new Center for International Law, and if it lives up to
its predecessors, and I am sure it will, it will be an extremely informative,
educational experience for everyone, even those who know a great deal
about this subject.
The person who has been responsible for these symposia, and this
current symposium, is our new Professor C.V. Starr, Professor of the Law
of International Trade and Finance, Sydney M. Cone, III. He is our host.
Terry, as many of you know, is a long-time partner at Cleary, Gottlieb,
and had vast experience in the area of International Finance. He is also
a very old friend of mine. I met him when we both started at the Yale
Law School back in 1956.
He's done remarkable things in his life, and he continues to do them
here at the New York Law School. We have really been pleased, those
of us who have watched from the sidelines with encouragement and
whatever support we can bring, to the growing development of the
International Law Center. Terry has had a lot of help in putting together
the symposium from our students and from Lene, his assistant. It has been
a remarkable achievement, and these are not easy to put together. Let me
assure you having had experience in trying to do so. And so, Terry, won't
you come up and receive the applause of the assembled and introduce the
panel.
MR. CONE: Thank you. I would like to immediately make a point of
clarification. Although Harry and I started at Yale Law School at the
same time, he started as a professor, and I started as a student. We are
quite happy to have such a strong panel with us today to talk about Latin
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American financing. Latin American financing is a very topical topic, and
it seems to become more so with every passing year. In the 1980s, Latin
American financing generally connoted debt rescheduling, or restructuring,
the restructuring of sovereign debt, the restructuring of private debt.
In the 1990's, Latin American financing has increasingly connoted
securities offerings, project finance, structured finance, privatizations. It
has been associated with capital investment, investment of local capital in
Latin American, foreign capital investment in Latin America. It has
been associated with the offering and listing of securities, both locally in
Latin America and by Latin American offerors or issuers in global capital
markets.
There was, of course, the Mexican economic crisis, that began in
December of 1994. Viewed from April of 1997, what seems to be most
remarkable about that crisis is the fact that recovery was relatively quick,
and seems to be across the board very strong.
The Mexican economic crisis of 1994, began in December of 1994,
seems already to be a matter of history, and the Latin American economy
seemed to be quite strong. In any event, there is, without question,
enormous amount of financing activity in Latin America. Qualified
financial institutions are extremely active in Latin America. They seem to
be competing with each other for Latin American business. Qualified law
firms are extremely busy in connection with this financing activity. This
is the general setting of this afternoon's symposium.
Let me mention that the symposium is being transcribed, and that the
proceedings will be published in the law school's Journal of International
and Comparative Law. I believe that a page is in your program that will
enable you to purchase the published proceedings, if you are interested in
doing so.
The four speakers that we are extremely happy to have here today,
and I will announce them in the order in which they are from my right,
Bill Gorin, a partner in Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; Sam Santos
of the Emerging Markets Partnership; Chris Kelly of Morgan Stanley; and
Jim Penrose of Standard & Poors. They will be speaking to us in that
order.
Over lunch, we decided that the best way to proceed was for all of the
speeches to be given, or all of the talks to be given, sequentially, one after
the other, and then to have questions, and not to pause for intermission.
There will be, as you can see, refreshments available; but we decided that
the best way to proceed was to wait until after the talks, and after the
questions and answers before we repaired to refreshments.
The first speaker is Bill Gorin, of the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton. This law firm has, in the 1980s and 1990's, developed
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a major Latin American practice, particularly a financing practice. Bill
has been in the forefront of this practice. I can think of no one better able
to talk to us about this subject of privatization. I am delighted, particularly
since he and I have been partners for so long, to introduce to you Bill
Gorin. Thank you.
MR. GORIN: I seek the same clarification that you did, which is that you
were the teacher and I was the student, similar to you and Dean
Wellington. As someone who has been closely involved in a number of
privatization transactions in various countries, I am sometimes asked to
comment on this subject, and I generally respond to privatization, with a
capital P, is not a subject which I, or really anyone, should be eager to
generalize. There are at least two reasons for that.
First, I am quite certain that I am not smart enough to master all that
the world has classified under the rubric of privatization, since Mrs.
Thatcher and the IMF made that term a buy word; and, second, I, from
time to time, try to be prudent, and I know enough, from my own
experience, to know that what is important is the details.
From one country to another, from one enterprise to another, there is
a great deal of variety, the reason, the circumstances, the methods and the
results that the scope for generalization is quite limited. One really needs
to be skeptical of experts, and one should be particularly skeptical of
experts on privatization. I want to use the first part of these remarks to try
to justify my skepticism by highlighting the heterogeneity of privatization
throughout the world.
I then want to speculate on why privatization, nevertheless, has the
power it does as a slogan, and to identify some pitfalls of taking too
seriously the proposition that there is a general globally desirable
phenomenon of privatization.
In the second part of these remarks, I will, however, try to gather my
courage and make several general observations about Privatization, with
a capital P, that may be useful in examining the structure of successful
Privatizations. I should admit, by way of background, that my perspective
is that of a business lawyer and what business lawyers do in Privatizations
is devise and document the sale process. My own experience personally
has been in advising governments and enterprises undergoing Privatization,
and has focused on very sizable transactions, especially in Latin America.
My firm's experience extends more broadly in Latin America, western
and eastern Europe, and Asia, and has also been largely, although not
exclusively, in advising governments and privatizing entities, as well as
investment bankers. As a result, I have a certain professional sympathy
for the situation of a government establishing a privatization program, and
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for a series of problems that recur when the process of selling a business,
with all of its legal, contractual and marketing mechanisms, intersects with
the public policy objectives of a government.
It is that uniquely political perspective that distinguishes the
privatization process from what is otherwise just another merger and
acquisition or capital markets exercise. In light of the focus of others at
this conference on global offerings generally, or at least one other, my
remarks will focus on the why and how of privatizations, whether or not
they involve a public offering of securities.
I would like to begin by asking why the state or a government should
sell a particular enterprise. There are a number of possible reasons which
often overlap and intersect, and which sometimes have contradictory
implications. Perhaps the broadest motive is a historical trauma, broad
because it may sweep away many of the finer considerations I will mention
later on.
I think, for example, that the Eastern European privatizations should
be viewed in a different light from programs elsewhere in the world,
because they arose from the total collapse of the state, and in a setting
from which most of the infrastructure of a market economy was wholly
absent. As a Polish minister is reported to have said, the privatization of
Eastern Europe means selling property that belongs to no one, and has no
known value to people who have no money. There was no intelligent
alternative to privatization, and mass privatization virtually imposed itself
as a method.
Another very different historical transformation accounts at least in
part for privatization in Hong Kong, following the agreement to transfer
the colony to Chinese administration which will take place in just a couple
of months. A recent scholarly paper makes the interesting argument that
a significant component in the cycle of nationalization and privatization in
many countries is change in the balance of power between groups,
especially ethic groups that compete for control of the state, and control
of enterprises.
To the extent that historical trauma lies behind privatization, it greatly
weakens the likelihood of drawing useful lessons from one country for the
process in another. Some governments have privatized to raise money, or
by accepting public debt in payment to reduce debt directly. Without
wishing to tread into the gardens of the experts in public finance, I think
one can be skeptical of the significance of the amounts that are raised.
They are, at best, a shot in arm; although, one that could be very useful.
The Mexican government used privatization proceeds to establish a
special fund to stabilize commodity price risk on exports and interest rate
risk on foreign debt. Other governments have tried to use privatization
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proceeds to improve the budget balance in a particular year, often with
electoral strategy in mind. At worst, however, raising money through
privatization is like adding water to a leaking bucket. The cases of Brazil
and Italy come to mind. The proceeds of privatization, a nonrecurring
gain, will not do much to repair structural problems in public finances.
Of course, one of the world's most dramatically successful
privatization programs of over 10,000 enterprises in the former East
Germany was an enormous drain on German public finances. It was,
among other things, a complex and highly original subsidy program to
preserve employment and productive infrastructure, while beginning the
transition to a market economy.
A broader reason to privatize, of course, is part of a program of
structural reforms of public finance. In short, fix the holes in the bucket.
This was the driving element in many of the successful Latin American
privatization programs. The Chilean case is the most clearly successful,
but notwithstanding some exchange rate driven hiccups in Mexico. In
Argentina a couple of years, the reform of public bands in those countries
associated with privatization efforts can be argued to be quite successful
as well.
The place of privatization in such program of reforms, however, is
complex. Many other measures are also required, and they are much more
difficult politically and practically. Economic stabilization, tax reform,
debt reduction, reductions in other areas of government expenditure, and
so on. Privatization cannot do the job alone.
More importantly, privatization is only viable if the buyers can hope
for a reasonable return on their investment, and it will only replace public
investment if it establishes conditions that attract and reward new private
investment. If the business is going to be profitable, though, why not keep
it in state hands and make the same changes? In banking, for example,
privatization in some countries has involved what Americans like to call
the good bank/bad bank strategy, separate the doubtful assets for the state
to keep, and sell the rest.
A graphic illustration is the sometimes vexing case of the French bank
Credit Lionnais (phonetic); a more complicated would be the bailout of
the so-called thrift institutions in the United States. The French have
applied analogous strategies in their steel and computer industries.
Whatever else they are, though, these transactions are not immediately
good for the public finances. Often the underlying assumption that a
particular endeavor can be profitable in private hands, but not in state
hands. This might be because the private sector is in a position to be more
efficient, or to bring more managerial or technical experience to bear.
1998]
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But often it is because the privatized entity will be able to charge
higher prices, where the state-owned enterprise simply could not. This is
often true of infrastructure facilities, telecommunications and utilities. A
highway, for example, has, in theory, a level of tolls that maximizes
revenues, and it may be high enough to provide a return on the investment
required to build or improve the road. But, in many countries, that toll is
just too high for a governmental agency to charge, as a political matter.
That could mean that there is a case for private development of the road.
That could be so even if, as is likely, the cost of financing is higher for
private parties than it would be for the government. I would argue that
that case is political as much as it is financial.
That brings me to the most basic reason of which I believe there is for
privatization, which is a general change in philosophy about the proper
role of a state in the economy. I don't propose to try your patience with
a mere lawyer reciting the virtues for which private ownership is said to
stand or the costs it may impose. I am, after all, an outsider to the
technical futures of the empirical arguments. But I do think that the
empirical case for private ownership is highly specific to the
circumstances, and that it depends on the country, the industry, and the
method of privatization.
I also believe it rests on probability, and that the same benefits can,
in principle, be achieved through other means, while maintaining state
ownership. It is just less likely to work. And I suspect in any specific
case, the empirical arguments are not conclusive. The best they can do is
identify likely benefits, and if they are honest costs, all of them to be
realized over a long-term, and affected by many other factors. Reasonable
people will differ on their relative weights.
I, therefore, think that the belief in a reduced role for the state is as
much a matter of ideology as of science, which is not to say that it is
wrong, and even less to say that I disagree. Indeed, the most striking thing
about the idea of a reduced state role in the economy is the breadth of its
appeal.
When the Mayor of New York says that the City is in many
businesses, but there's no reason for it to be in the radio business, I
believe he commanded broad agreement. Another interesting example is
telecommunications, where the issues and the alternatives are perceived as
strikingly similar from country to country, and the trend toward
privatization is virtually universal. But we must be modest about the
durability of such changes in philosophy. A poignant example is the tight
cycle of nationalization and privatization in France, where the very
enterprises that were nationalized in 1982 began to be privatized in 1986.
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Another example is the banking industry in Mexico. It was
nationalized in 1982, privatized often to the same hands from which they
had been taken in 1992 and 1993. And one of the most discouraging
consequences of the situation in Mexico in 1995 and 1996, following the
crisis that Terry referred to, was that some of the banks ended up back in
government hands, where they will have to be cleaned up. It is happening
now, and being sold off once again.
Now, up until now, I have mentioned some of the more immediate
reasons for undertaking privatization in different countries. There are a
number of less direct reasons that have taken on varying degrees of
importance in different countries. These include simulating domestic
capital markets, broadening the base of property investments, improving
management, and attracting technical expertise, especially from abroad.
There are also a number of exogenous forces for privatization,
including pressure from other governments, from international financial
institutions, and from regional organizations. To this picture of the
complex goals of privatization, we should add that the diversity of the
particular circumstances in which privatizable state enterprises find
themselves. Some lose money, some make money. Some compete in a
part of a global market, like the many steel makers or cement makers that
have been privatized, or like mining and petroleum extraction companies.
Others have been protected from competition in the domestic market, like
airlines, telephone companies, and many manufacturers. Almost all have
difficult labor situations, but the nature of the problems vary widely.
Some desperately need foreign expertise. Some are in corporate form, and
have publicly-traded shares, and high standards of reporting and record
keeping. Others have been run as government agencies and lack
intelligible financial statements. There are, in short, dozens of different
reasons for privatization, and I think it is worth pausing for a moment on
the durability of privatization as a banner or slogan.
There could be no doubt of its power as a political matter, to help sell
to the public significant changes in economic organization, on grounds that
are appealing to people disillusioned with the state. Mrs. Thatcher used
it to great effect, but more striking in the way is the success of Latin
America governments in creating a consensus for privatization programs
that were far broader in their effects. When Mexico privatized its
telephone company, President Salinas went on the road in Mexico to
convince his citizens, apparently successfully, that the higher rates to be
paid by the lucky few with phone service were the price for ultimately
making telephone service better and more widely available.
In view of the complexity of the economic issues, the appeal of the
slogan is very valuable. Similarly, I have been struck by the enthusiasm
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for privatization on the part of management of state-owned enterprises,
which I believe is partly a matter of self-interest, but also very much a
matter of conviction, partaking of the same political appeal.
Of course, one constituency that believes fervently in privatization are
the managers of international portfolio capital. They have wrung to its
pillars throughout the emerging markets for a number of years now, in
spite the recent fluctuations in the value of emerging market investments.
I believe they can be expected to do so again, particularly with the recent
successes of the Venezuelan and Peruvian telephone company offerings,
and with such large scale privatization as the Brazilian mining giant,
CVRD looming on the horizon. Privatization goes hand in hand with
lower tariffs and stable monitoring policies as a sign that all is well.
One particularly important sub class of international investor in many
countries is flight capital for which privatization is an important signal to
return. A sign of this can be seen in the Brazilian stock markets. The
Brazilian government has been arguing, partly in public, with itself over
whether and how to privatize the telephone company, Telobrous
(phonetic), the mining company CVRD and the principal electrical
distribution companies. Every negative rumor on privatization makes
prices fall, and every encouraging rumor makes them rise, not only for the
companies involved, but for the whole (indiscernible) market.
All this enthusiasm is fine, even appropriate. As long as one does not
lose sight of the underlying complexity of the issues There is a risk of
falling pray to easy analogies where the realities of each country and each
industry may be critically different. Privatization can also come to see an
end in itself. When a privatization goes wrong, it makes matters much
worse.
The airlines of Latin America provide a strong cautionary tale. Those
that lost money in public hands have continued to lose money in private
hands. Enchantment with privatization can also mask the degree to which
it is used to concentrate economic power in the hands of an existing elite.
One can argue that this happened throughout Latin America, and I think
one can also argue that this was a reasonable strategy, or at least an
acceptable outcome, to further economic stability.
In France, the composition of the core group of stable shareholders,
so-called noy oi deur (phonetic) ostensibly to provide stable ownership and
breathing space for management has been attached as a maneuver to
preserve the political affiliations of privatized companies. The recent
debate over privatization in Italy has also focused attention on the role of
the merchant banking elite in taking control of prospective privatizations.
Having spoken for a few minutes generally about the why of privatization
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with a capital P, now let me turn more to the how of the privatization
process.
From a business lawyer's perspective, the common feature of
privatization, outside of eastern Europe where the absence of a market
economy has made for a very different process, is that in a context of
complex policy goals and political sensitivities, they used the ordinary tools
of business transactions.
What makes them an unusual, and, therefore, interesting genre,
however, is that they are often designed by people whose grasp of the
policy goals, and especially the political issues, outstrips their familiarity
with the prosaic tools. Let's start with who is usually in charge.
As in any sale of a business, someone has to speak to the seller, take
responsibility for the big decisions and coordinate the efforts of others.
This function has to be centralized and it has to report directly to that part
of the government that has made privatization its agenda. This is a
problem in every privatization with which I have been involved, because
the issues are so complicated, and because the commitment to privatization
typically does not have any institutional infrastructure behind it. Often
those parts of the government that have the infrastructure have different
agendas of their own. Approaches have varied widely. In Brazil, the
national development bank, the NDS, was for time charged with managing
privatization. In Germany an enormous ad hoc independent government
agency was established. In many countries, such as Mexico, a smaller
independent unit had been established within the ministry of finance. The
agency can, of course, differ for different privatizations. But however it
is handled, the privatization function has to be temporary. This argues for
making it a special high-level function with a lien staff.
Because the job is so vast, a small privatization agency must rely for
much of the work on the privatizing entity itself, and on the other
ministries involved, especially in a regulated industry. It will also have to
rely heavily on outside advisors, in effect privatizing the very process of
privatization. This bring me to my next point, the role of the advisor.
There are two very different kinds of assistance a privatizing
government needs to hire from the outside because they are hard to find
or develop within the government or the state-owned enterprises
themselves.
One is what I would call advisory work, which includes some of the
following: Valuation work; legal work, of course; technical regulatory
issues, such as developing a workable telephone concession; advice on
financing practices, typically, for example, in project finance; helping to
design the process, especially to make it responsive to the expectations of
perspective investors; organizing and conducting manpower intensive
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aspects of the transaction, such as preparing a disclosure document; and
conducting negotiations with perspective buyers. After all, entrusting
negotiations to an agent is not only efficient, it also can sometimes have
important tactical advantages.
Advisory work can be done, depending on the category, by bankers,
consultants, academics, lawyers, and others. But the key feature in
selection is the skill of a small team of people who will be directly and
intensively involved.
The other category of assistance I would call marketing, which
includes finding perspective buyers, and interesting them in a transaction,
trying to foster consortia to bid together, advising on disclosure, and
conducting an offering of the shares. These are functions for bankers, and
unlike advisory work, they require the strength of a whole institution with
a network of resources.
One of particular features of share offerings, for example, is that the
seller often meets the people who will actually sell the shares at the very
end of the process, if at all. Using advisors effectively is not only a matter
of picking good ones, and knowing how to listen to them. It also means
structuring their roles so as to be sure of their loyalties, and devising
compensation arrangements that do not contain perverse incentives. Fees
based on success or the amount of the proceeds, for example, are often
appropriate or unavailable for marketing assignments, but they may not be
for advisory assignments. When dealing with international investment
banks, too, it should be borne in mind that some of them may stand to
make far more money out of a share offering on subsequent trading than
out of any advisory assignment.
Turning from the people involved in the process to the patient itself,
privatization is almost never a sale of a going business as is. Instead, it
begins with a transformation of the enterprise, and its specific competitive
and regulatory environment. This can involve technical issues, such as
adopting ordinary corporate form, and generally accepted accounting
principles. It also frequently involves revising the boundaries of the
enterprise to carve off activities that just will not work in private hands
for one reason or another.
In regulated industries, it involves establishing a regulatory structure
that will, to a great extent, determine the prospects of the enterprise. The
problem here is that the political costs of miscalculation can be enormous.
In regulated industries, profitability may be politically acceptable if it
involves increased prices when it leads to increased investment and
perceptively better service. But when the benefits are slow or hard to see,
or when the cash starts to pile up, the politics can change.
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A dramatic example occurred in England just a couple of years ago.
A takeover fight involving the privatized regional electric company
Northern Electric highlighted Northern's profitability and led the electricity
regulator to announce a review of pricing to the electrical sector as a
whole. Unfortunately, the announcement came less than one day after the
privatization of states and two generating firms for roughly four billion
pounds, deeply embarrassing the government.
Some of the most difficult problems in every country involve the work
force. Privatization might be good for employment in general, but, in any
particular enterprise, it is unlikely to be consistent with existing staffing
levels, work rules and job security. The distribution of shares to
employees, a common feature of privatization, can only go so far to
weaken resistance to structural changes. There are some things that work,
and telecommunication privatizations in emerging markets, governments
have been able to secure the cooperation of powerful unions by
establishing a trade off. Your jobs will be protected, but you will have to
accept thorough changes in job categories and work rules.
The promise of job security means buyers will pay less, but, in that
particular sector, the enterprise can expect to grow out of the overstaffing
situation. Telemex, for example, increased lines and service by 12 percent
per year in each of the four years after its privatization, while keeping its
head count strictly unchanged.
In many of the western European privatizations, unions have extracted
varying trade-offs of their own. This issue was significant in the recent
privatization of Deutsche Telecom, and it will be interesting to see what
takes place with respect to France Telecom in light of the very serious
strikes that plagued France during 1996. In other cases, the government
has either undertaken the thankless task of work force restructuring itself,
which results in a higher price, or given buyers a green light to do it
themselves, which may produce a more efficient result.
In terms of process, transparency is a buy word of privatization
everywhere, partly to distance the process from the aroma of corruption,
and partly to build political consensus behind the process. But
privatization does not really lend itself to being conducted in public. It is
far too complicated and much of it involves negotiations that require
confidentiality.
Auctions, in particular, are often adopted in an effort to insure
transparency. The government sets up the enterprise to be sold, offers
specific contractual terms, takes bids, and then awards the enterprise on
the basis of price. The problem can be that this process is terribly rigid.
The give and take of negotiation provides crucial information about what
buyers value, and what they are willing to pay for, and it is not a zero sum
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gain. That's why, in ordinary private sector sales of businesses, sellers that
set up auctions often stop the auction at some point and negotiate. In
addition, governments usually want the flexibility to consider elements
other than price, such as the suitability of investors and their plans for the
enterprise. It is very hard to incorporate those judgments into an auction.
In the privatization of the Mexican steel industry, we worked with
other advisors to the government to devise a complex formula to weigh
various non-price elements of competing bids for loss-making enterprises.
In the privatization of Telemex, the prequalifying stage was used to help
assemble viable consortia of competing bidders. Each included a Mexican
component, where voting control would ultimately rest and a
technologically sophisticated component, one or more international
telecommunications groups, to provide the necessary expertise to upgrade
the system after privatization.
The concession, which was commented on, and to some degree
negotiated, with the various consortia in advance of the auction, contains
the requirements for that system's upgrade in terms of increased lines, rate
of call success, etcetera, which was the driving force behind the
privatization in the first place. Now these efforts to make the auction
process more flexible, and to achieve something more than the appearance
of selecting a winner on the objective basis of best price, are, I believe,
relatively unusual. In any case, the public contracting experience suggests
a bidding process is no guaranty that there will not be corruption.
It might be more fruitful to take a broader view of transparency.
Broad objectives and general rules of procedure should be the subject of
open debate and consensus building. Rules should be clear, consistently
applied and established in advance. That may sound banal, but changing
the rules, or making them at the last minute, has been one of the great
problems, especially for foreign investors in many Latin American
privatizations.
Foreign investors cannot guess at the political background to changing
rules, or call on friends and connections for guidance, and the real
decisions makers in the head office are usually looking at the situation
through many layers, and, perhaps, in translation. They crave clarity and
consistency.
On the other hand, the rules themselves can recognize the importance
of confidentiality and the need to exercise complex judgments, as long as
the privatizers are accountable politically for the results. On that score,
an open and constructive public relations policy can go a long way.
Another aspect of the privatization process on which government's focus,
with mixed success, is obtaining long-term commitments from buyers.
Unfortunately, outside the regulated industry, such as telecommunications,
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it can be very difficult to hold buyers to long-term commitments by means
of contractual undertakings in privatizations.
The idea most often arises in privatizing loss making enterprises where
buyers will be expected to make significant investments. But such
promises can be hard to enforce down the road. The privatizing agency
will not usually have the capacity to monitor compliance, and it may not
have much leverage when the time comes. More importantly, they will
have very little desire to admit that the process has failed by seeking a
remedy. A recent world bank report urged that the most important
measure of success of a privatization program is the aura of success, which
is not surprising when one considers the political context in which
privatization occurs.
As in any sale of a business enterprise, a key element is the amount
of information regarding the enterprise, that can be forwarded to
perspective buyers, particularly foreigners. Governments, however, are
generally unwilling to provide extensive contractual warranties of
information about the enterprise to be privatized, and they often just don't
have very much information themselves. Investors who are looking to
control an enterprise and improve its performance need to investigate it in
depth, and they will not be satisfied with only historical data and with the
information that the government and the enterprise itself may deem
relevant. Outsiders who have no opportunity to investigate are sure to
apply a discount for uncertainty, and to stand at a disadvantage compared
to insiders, and may be unwilling to bid at all.
To avoid or minimize these problems, governments have allowed
extensive due diligence investigations by perspective buyers, often setting
up so-called data rooms for the review of documents, and making
management available for interviews. This may require prequalification
of bidders to somewhat reduce the burden this may impose, but, in any
event, it will make the process much more demanding and time consuming
for the government. Although privatizations often involve a sale to a
strategic buyer, at least as a first step, the really large privatizations
invariably involve a global public offering. Thus, it is possible only from
the most attractive and best prepared companies, and it takes a relatively
long time, but for many emerging markets a major international
privatization offering has provided the impetus for an opening of domestic
markets generally for foreign capital.
Nevertheless, it can be a tricky proposition in several respects. The
most obvious example is, as recent developments in Mexico illustrate,
investors that have been herded into a country can also be stampeded out.
The long-term benefits of attracting them can only be sustained by
remaining over the long-term a comparatively attractive place to invest.
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A subtler issue in international offerings is that it can be very difficult
for the seller to control the price and the placement process. The chief
executive of one of our clients once compared the process to taking part
in the running of the bulls at Panplona. In the privatization of British
Telecom, YPF, the Argentine oil and gas company, governments have
tried, with some success, to monitor price formation and the selection of
investors as closely as possible. But the international marketing process
is a huge process with its own momentum, and only a limited degree of
control is really possible.
Another issue in opening ownership to international investors can be
concern over maintaining local or some degree of governmental control,
particularly for industries such as telecommunications that are viewed as
essential. The UK, Israeli, and certain other privatization, for example,
have utilized the so-called golden share, which is retained by the
government and provides it with control over fundamental changes to the
enterprise.
In Telemex, to cite another example, the capital structure was revised
prior to privatization to include the so-called L share, which has dividend
and liquidation rights equal to those of the other classes of shares in the
capital structure, but voting rights that are very limited and only limited to
a few fundamental corporate matters. This change, coupled with a trust
arrangement that allowed the Mexican member of the strategic buying
consortium to control the shares sold to the consortium enabled the
Mexican government to raise well over $2 billion for its stake in Telemex,
while leaving a Mexican company in control.
Now, in closing, I guess I would just like to say that it bears repeating
that the benefits associated with privatization also involve a number of
changes in the general business environment. Just to pick one example,
one of the special features of a success of privatization in Chile has been
the establishment of a system of private pension funds, that not only
channels domestic savings into the stock market, but also provides a
counterweight to the power of the big industrial groups.
A partial list of some of these changes would include changes in labor
regulation and the regulation of competition, in accounting practices and
auditing standards, in currency policy and monetary policy, in domestic
capital formation, in taxation, in foreign investment legislation, in stock
market regulation, and in management accountability. The list gives some
measure of the challenges of the privatization undertaking, and also the
breadth of positive changes that it can, if well managed, entail. Thank you
very much.
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MR. GORIN: Bill, thank you very, very much. Our next speaker is Sam
Santos. His biography is in the program. It is a very impressive
biography. In one respect, the program is much too laconic. It says,
Everett J. Santos is Chief Executive Officer of the Latin American group
of Emerging Markets Partnership and Managing Director of the Principal
Advisor of Latin American Infrastructure Fund of American International
Group and General Electric Capital Corporation. The fund has
approximately U.S. $1 billion in assets under management. That is
misleading. Of the billion dollars, 150 million was put up by American
International Group, 150 million was put on by General Electric Capital
Corporation, and 700 million was raised from other sources by Sam
Santos. I am really honored to be able to present Mr. Santos.
MR. SANTOS: Thank you very much. And to show you how well,
Terry, you organized this seminar, the previous speaker spoke about
transparency, and transparency as being a very important component to
privatization, and I have a whole slew of transparencies as a consequence.
While he is setting it up, let me say a couple of words. There is a lot
of arguments as to why privatization should or shouldn't be done. I think
probably the best reason for doing privatization is exemplified by a little
placard, which wasn't so little, actually, it was a big banner, in an East
German factory in which it said: "Workers of the world, forgive me."
Karl Marx.
The other is probably something that was glibly said by most people
in eastern Europe, in most command economies, that government expected
workers to work, and workers made believed they worked, and
governments made believed they paid. So that's really one of the reasons
that privatization is absolutely necessary.
Let me say a couple of words while we get together on putting the
transparencies up about the AIGG Capital American Latin America
Infrastructure Fund, which Terry mentioned. It is a billion dollars. It is
actually $1 billion 13 million as of right now. The fund has been
organized basically to invest in infrastructure throughout Latin America.
That's everything south of the Rio Grande down to Cape Horn. It is
investing, or will be investing, in all areas of infrastructure. By
infrastructure, we mean the areas of power, telecommunication, transport.
We also have expanded the definition of infrastructure, since the dictionary
is fairly undefined as to what infrastructure means, and we have extended
it actually to areas such as mining, petrochemical, oil and gas, and similar
areas.
Well, let me tell you a little story about Bill Clinton, since I am from
Washington D.C. As you know, his daughter is going off to college, and
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he said, well, you know, one good thing and bad thing about that is, one
is that we are going to have our daughter off to college and we will be
alone, and the good thing, of course, is I have an extra bedroom. All
right. I think we are all set up. It was worthwhile.
Just in case some of you don't know where Latin America is, the
purple area is where we expect about 80 percent of the investments in
infrastructure to take place. That is not happenstance. It is not necessarily
because these countries are more aggressive in their privatization than
others. It is really more a function of GDP. That's about where 80
percent of Latin America's GDP is concentrated. So it is in the countries
of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Columbia.
As you probably know, Latin American's annual GDP growth, during
1990 to 1994, is about 3.7, which is not particularly stellar, since in '70s,
before the debt crisis, it was growing at about 7 percent, and, in fact, was
the fastest growing region of the world at one point in time, much faster
than the tigers were growing at that time.
There was, and is, actually, a slower growth during 1995, still a little
bit of a hangover from the Mexican debt crisis. I would say that, in that
context, that had it not been for the very, very quick action and rather
profound action on the part of the IMF and the world bank and the Clinton
administration, probably what happened in Mexico could have deteriorated
into some something much more serious and would have probably dragged
down a lot of Latin America with it. The fact that they are already
experiencing growth is an indication that their actions were well taken.
The World Bank is now starting to expect the regions to grow at about 6
percent, that was our projections, obviously. I think, in fact, all the
structural reforms that have been taken justify that projection.
Latin America has really gone through a major macroeconomic
reforms. As you probably don't know, unless you've read my resume in
that book, I was working with the World Bank, with IFC. I was heading
up Latin America and the Caribbean as director, actually during a good
part of the debt crisis, and then subsequently took over, actually created
the infrastructure department in the International Finance Corporation, and
ran that department which had worldwide responsibility for infrastructure.
The real point, in terms of Latin America, is how significantly it has
changed in terms not only of its own fiscal reforms, how it's gotten
inflation under control, but, also, its political and structural reforms across
the board. As you all know probably, Latin America had one of the more
extraordinary inflation period ever, and it almost tied the Weimar Republic
at one point in time in some of the countries. Now you have some
countries that are actually running inflation in very, very low, single digits.
Argentina's actually run now for three years and inflation rate lower than
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that of the United States. That's a country that had four-digit inflation not
too long ago. Those sorts of structural reforms, the reduction of fiscal
deficits, almost nonexistence in many countries, makes many of the
countries of Latin America actually meet the Masonic Treaty (phonetic)
requirements for the union participation. Something a lot of the European
countries do not do. So it shows you the change that has occurred in
terms of Latin America.
The government themselves, by seven, eight years ago, you could
have counted on one hand the number of governments that were actually
elected. Today there is but one exception, that being the country of my
parents origin, Cuba, that does not have an elected government. All the
other countries have, to a greater or lesser extent in some cases, elected
governments.
If we can have the next one. As you can see there, the fiscal deficit
fell from 9 percent in '83, an extraordinary amount of fiscal deficit, it is
now running 3 percent in 1994. Actually it is lower now. And if you
took Brazil out of the equation, it actually would be even lower than that.
Brazil is the one country that is still performing a little bit more
aggressively on the fiscal deficit side than it should be.
The legal and structural reforms are massive. Privatization is
requiring a lot of that, regulatory reforms are being undertaken. Also, if
you look at Latin America, it is really trying to impose regulatory reform
that promote competition. That is, where possible, they try to get the
market to respond to producing the appropriate economic environment for
those services provided. A good indication, I guess, is in the electricity
sector, where power generation has been put basically on a competitive
mode in Chile, in Argentina, and is now being talked about doing the same
thing in Brazil, and a lot of other countries. That is way ahead of that of
the United States. It is probably way ahead of a good portion of Europe,
that is now just talking about bringing competition to the production of
electricity.
During the 1980s, one shouldn't be surprised that infrastructure was
very badly hit. It was running at about 3 percent of GDP in terms of
investments. That is a massive disinvestment in terms of the needs of the
country. If you look at most countries, and the reality is that you should
be investing a much larger portion, if you are still in the development
stage. I think the United States is one of those exceptions, because it has
invested so much over time in its infrastructure, even though, when one
comes to New York, one wonders whether or not it shouldn't be investing
a little bit more in infrastructure. But it is still, in terms of overall needs
of a portion of GDP, a relatively small amount in most OECD countries.
But the expanding economies, East Asia, those countries are investing 7
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percent. The government of Singapore, in many instances, has invested as
much as 10 percent of GDP. That's one of the reasons why it has grown
as rapidly.
The reality is that infrastructure is the driving force for sustaining
economic development and allowing countries to become competitive on
an international basis. Without infrastructure investment, it can't be done.
What do we expect to be invested in infrastructure over the next 10
years on an annual basis? Well, if you look there, that is what the World
Bank expects to be invested in the various sectors of infrastructure, $60
billion a year. That's a rather extraordinary amount, and it would be
enough to keep everybody fairly active.
Power requirements are $24 billion, transport $14 billion, telecom $10
billion, water and sanitation $12 billion, and I believe that these are
remarkably understated. They should be expanded rather dramatically.
That's about 4.5 percent of GDP.
During the 1970's, Latin America was investing a little bit more than
that in its GDP. What it really should be investing is about 7 percent. And
if these countries allow infrastructure to operate in a purely market
economy, you would see a lot more investments in infrastructure. There's
no doubt that the economies could sustain it, the economic returns are
there for infrastructure, the economic value to justify the investments is
there, and the countries could well afford the investments.
Just to give you an indication, one of our investors is Archer, Daniel,
Midlands, and, obviously, is very interested in agricultural and agricultural
development. The comparison that they make in terms of an American
farmer getting his crops to market, as opposed to a Latin American
farmer, shows you the importance of infrastructure. Basically, they say
that it takes a Latin American farmer five to ten times as much in terms
of costs to get his products to market.
Now, that can be captured in terms of allowing someone to pay
reasonable charges for transportation, railroad, port terminals, and the like.
If you look at the per capita investment in Latin America, it is about
$1,050 per capita. If you look at it in terms of where it is compared to the
OECD countries, that would make between a half a trillion to $1.5 trillion
deficit to get it up to the levels of the OECD countries. So there is a
massive deficiency that has to be made up over time. You don't expect
that to be made up overnight, or over the next five or ten years, but
clearly, if these countries are going to reach the stage of development that
we went through about 20 to 30 years ago, maybe even 50 years ago, they
need those sorts of investments.
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Brazil's infrastructure, is a total catastrophe in terms of what its needs
are. Its investments per capita are about 910, which makes it even lower
than the average of Latin America. The value, in terms of OECD level,
and this is a number that I think is fairly relevant, the poorest of the
OECD countries, and Mexico is an OECD country, but we don't include
Mexico in that, is basically $4,000. So it about -- per capita.
That's about where Portugal is and Greece, in terms of per capita
investment in infrastructure. The United States investment in infrastructure
is about $10,000 per capita. That's about where Germany is and Japan is,
etcetera. You can make certain calculations. That's how you come up
with that deficit of about a half trillion to 1.5 trillion. To get Latin
America up to the levels of the poorest, it would take a half a trillion to
get it up to U.S. levels. It would take it up to about 1.5 trillion. What
does Brazil expect over the next five years? And these are from
government figures. They expect to invest $72 billion over the next four
or five years for infrastructure projects. They have in the federal budget
about 7.3 billion allocated. That leaves a gap of about 7 to 11 billion per
year. So assuming they invest between 14 and 17, that is a very large,
just for Brazil alone. Next chart.
Let me tell you in a couple of words where all that money is coming
from. One of the major sources, obviously, are funds, such as the fund
that we were able to create at AIG&G Capital. It is a -- going to be a
player. It is not the major player, obviously, it is only part of the overall
capital markets that has to be mobilized. The largest of the large, power
companies, telecommunication companies, and transport companies, and
the like, will be putting in substantial amounts of money into these projects
to fund the investment.
A lot of it has to come, obviously, from local sources, as well. And
one of the benefits actually of infrastructure development is that it is, in
fact, intertwined in a very strong way, it creates a mesh of sustaining
economic development, with infrastructure being on one side, the recipient
of the funds that come from the capital markets development. You can't
have a capital markets developed unless you have infrastructures to invest
in. They are the natural recipients of long-term money that is provided by
investors. You can't have pension funds. You can't have insurance
companies, unless they are able to invest in the economy. And a good part
of the economy, especially in the developing world, is, in fact,
infrastructure.
A good exercise is to look at the United States, and you look at what
was on the Dow Jones list of companies in the year 1900. And if you look
at that list, you probably find just about two or three companies that are
still on there. The reality is that it is totally changed. What used to be
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considered the important parts of the economy has changed because, in
fact, the U.S. has changed. It has moved away from all those
infrastructure-type projects that actually composed the Dow Jones into
much more industrial projects, the software, and all of the rest of the
operations. So it's really changed.
In any case, those are the equity sources where we tapped a good
portion of the money that we had to for our funds. We expect a lot of
those investors will also be providing investments to infrastructure projects
generally.
One thing that I think we must focus on is how different the capital
flows are today from what it was not too long ago. The fund looks at what
was happening in the 1970's, and in the 1980s. The private flows were
very, very small, and the public flow was rather substantial. That is
basically you had the bilateral assistance, multilateral support, or even
government flows internally. Now what you are seeing is enormous
increase in private flows, and I will show you how that translates in terms
of numbers, if we can go onto the next line. I am not certain if it is the
next one, but it will be there eventually.
Okay. A little help and assistance. Public flows to emerging markets
over the recent years reached a peak in 1991 at $62 billion. That was
when there was a peak of federal funds that went into Latin America.
That was a growth from $5.3 billion in the 1970s, and now the level is
about $54 billion If you compare that -- the next one slide.
Don't worry, I will speak to whatever you put up there. Private versus
public flows have grown. The private flows have grown, they are very
large, at a very rapid pace. And, in fact, the private flows have gone
from $5.7 billion in 1970 to 240 billion in 1996, and the estimate for this
year is about $250 billion from private sources.
This, basically, dwarfs all public monies that are going out. Total net
capital flows, increase has been significant. $11 billion in the '70s, to '86,
'82, to 284 in 1996. That makes it basically about $46 billion from public
sources, since $240 billion was from private sources. The 1995 and 1996,
basically the same theme. The private flows have continued to grow. East
Asia, in fact, continues to be a very large recipient of money. Latin
America is getting a substantial part, about a quarter of it, but East Asia
is getting a much larger amount. That should be expected actually. The
region of East Asia has a much larger population base; it is much further
behind in terms of infrastructure
If you look at the thousand dollars per capita that exists in Latin
America, I think if the number comes up to $250 per capita in Asia, I
would be very, very surprised. Bond placement is one of the things that
is growing. There is an increase, and you are going to get Standard &
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Poors to talk to you, in a couple of minutes, if I get off the stage, about
the rating agencies, etcetera. Clearly, the rating of bonds is going to be
a very important part of making possible bond offerings. There is still a
lot of things that have to be done in terms of improving the globalization
of markets. There is still a lot in terms of deficiencies, in terms of
regulatory reforms, and even with structure, that have to be done.
I think that most countries are recognizing that they cannot depend on
themselves to finance all their needs, and they must, in fact, as a
consequence, tap the international markets. They have a need for
regulatory reforms in the United States, to allow the issuance of these
bonds, continuing, of course, the necessity of making certain that the
bonds meet the quality and the disclosure requirements that are necessary
to make an informed judgment. But, nonetheless, you know, there's still
a lot of things that have to be done.
Let me just say a couple of words about that last item. It is fairly
important to see how different the world is today. If you look at pension
fund hiring of international experience, over the last five years, it moved
from one out of every twenty hired, with some sort of international
experience for pension funds, and now it is one out of every five. The
pension funds are starting to realize, and, in fact, they need international
experience in order to handle their portfolios. I am certain that this is also
true, even though I couldn't get the numbers, but I am certain that the law
firms are also looking for more and more people with international
experience.
I want to say some things about pension fund reforms in Latin
America generally. The reality is that Chile was the first country really
to move away from a very bankrupt system in terms of its Social Security
into a privatized system in which, basically, 10 percent of their income has
to be put aside into a private pension system. This has transformed,
basically, Chile. Chile, about a week ago, adopted rules and regulations
which allow the Chilean pension funds to invest outside of Chile.
One of the reasons is that they have so much money in the system that
the reality is that they don't feel very comfortable with just dedicating the
funds within a very, very small economy. It is now enough that it really
represents three times its per capita income. So it is an extraordinary
transition. It's taken a system that was totally bankrupt, I mean bankrupt.
I mean the United States always cries about its Social Security system. It
would never have been transformed if Chile had the same Social Security
system that United States has, because it wasn't in the same category. It
just didn't have any money to payout anybody, and, clearly, it was totally
lost. That might exist in the United States in the year 2050, but hopefully
we won't get there.
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In Chile, it was very, very clear that they had to do something about
pension fund reform. The result of those reforms, though, is, in fact, it has
seeped out from Chile. It is now being adopted in Argentina, in Brazil,
in Columbia, in Mexico, in Peru, in Venezuela. All of the countries are
considering pension fund reforms. That's going to have a very significant
impact in terms of capital market developments in Latin America.
At the present time, if you look at Latin America's total capitalization
of its stock exchanges, it represents about a half a trillion dollars, $500
billion is a total capitalization of Latin America. If the pension funds
continue to grow at the rate that Chile grew in the past 10 years, that
capitalization, just from the amount that is coming into the pension funds,
clearly double that amount, and maybe even do more than double.
So, natural growth, plus pension fund reforms, you could have a
capital market that could be in the trillion plus range in terms of Latin
America. That changes your capital markets. It changes how people relate
to their economy. I would say, also, that there are other things that
happened with the pension fund It may seem it is totally irrelevant to the
infrastructure development, but it is not. The reality is that the first thing
that pension funds start to invest in after they buy government bonds is
infrastructure projects. They must have the local utility, local electric
company, local railroad, local water company, local whatever. Those are
the natural investments.
So infrastructure investments today, when they're still not enough
pension funds to absorb the needs of those countries, in terms of
infrastructure, should, in fact, make it possible for a fund like ours to
invest today, and, then, basically divest itself from investments that it made
to the pension fund system that will have a natural need for those securities
into their portfolios.
Here is a chart which helps you sort of appreciate the movement of
external financing to a major emerging market. This comes from the
International Institute of Finance. You can see the top blue segment being
the official creditors, and you can see what percentage it represented
during the early years. You can barely see, if you can see at all, the
years, but those are years down there. In 1990, the blue part there, you
can see how much of a significant part the official creditors represented,
and that is all the multi-laterals, all the export agencies, all the aid
programs, all the other lending programs that are around.
The equity component was significant, but relatively small. Banks had
disappeared. This is right after the debt crisis, so banks were almost
nonexistent, and the nonbank creditors were carrying some portion. But,




I had the pleasure, of course, of working with one of them, and knew
how important these flows were to those economies, Basically, the next
one is the same thing. The equity there is your blue part, which is just
putting the official creditors on the bottom, and you can see, it just
illustrates how much more important the equity components are, and how
important the banks and the nonbank creditors are compared to the official
sources. The official sources, basically, have disappeared.
I think that this is the appropriate scenario. It should be, in fact,
private sources. One of the reasons there was a debt crisis to begin with
is not that the official creditors were there, but that it was just too much
dependence on providing money to governments that were not investing
those funds in a way that was consistent with providing the economic rates
of return to justify the borrowing. So, when it came time to pay off those
loans, there wasn't enough in the coffers, and they weren't producing
enough to pay those loans off, and the result was the debt crisis. Not
surprising.
I am almost at the end. Just I thought I'd put out there the players in
a normal infrastructure project. You have government, you have the
regulators, you have the promoters of the project, you have the equity, you
have the operating company, you have the contractors, and you have
lenders, multilateral agencies, export agencies, etcetera.
The next one, I call this lawyers heaven. I know I am speaking at a
law school, so it is important to see conceptually what this means, even in
the simplest of transactions. I can't imagine anything simpler in terms of
being able to do a deal that involved an infrastructure project. It can't be
any simpler than that, and that's complicated enough. That's enough to
make everybody in this room pretty wealthy.
If you were to layer over, and make it complex, you probably
wouldn't be able to see the players from all the lines. It is just a massive
amount of legal work and regulatory and other aspects in terms of legal
expenditures that are necessary.
So, to summarize this whole thing, I think Latin America has clearly
gone through a transition. I think infrastructure is going to be a very
important area for development in the private sector, and it is going to
provide a lot of investment bankers with a lot of work. And, hopefully,
that chart will have some other lines all over the place to make people a
lot wealthier. Thank you.
MR. CONE: Chris, I can't improve on Sam's introduction of you as a
good investment banker and a good lawyer, probably these days in that
order. Chris Kelly is from Morgan Stanley. He is going to talk to us
about equity offerings and high-yield offerings by Latin American issuers.
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MR. KELLY: Thank you very much, Terry, for the introduction, and,
Sam, for the introduction. It is a pleasure to be here today. I would like
to talk a little bit today about just an overview of the current trends in the
Latin American debt and equity markets, again from the perspective of an
investment banker, and a defrocked lawyer, who has been working in the
region now for many years. Let me just tell you a little bit about what
I do for a living to put this in context. I spend 100 percent of my time
working on transactions as a banker in Latin America, and I'd say I spend
about 90 percent of that time working on public or quasi-public debt and
equity offerings, large scale, either SEC registered offerings or Rule
144(a) offerings.
I think Bill in describing what a banker does in privatizations gave a
very good summary of what the role is, in general, on any of these
transactions. It's really to advise clients on structuring, timing and sizing
these transactions, which are critical, I think for any issuer. But for Latin
American issuers, it is very often the first time they'll be doing a large
public debt or equity offering. And the advising as to the time and size is
very important. Secondly, we work with the lawyers and the accountants
and the other parties that come together in putting one of these transactions
together. Finally, we work on marketing the transaction and developing,
not only the marketing thesis in the disclosure document, which has legal
aspect, but, also, we work on putting that together with a working team,
and then enlisting the sales force in the company, take them out on a road
show to market the transaction to institutional investors.
I guess the last part of it is something that Bill touched on is probably
the least obvious. But in some ways, the most challenging part is
mobilizing the resources of the whole institution. The institution that I am
affiliated with is a very large institution, and on transactions that we work
on, there tend to be many bank institutions lined up. So a big part of the
challenge, a big part of my job, is being sort of the orchestra conductor to
bring all of the different pieces of one institutions, a series of different
institutions together, to get a successful execution of a transaction.
I would like to very briefly give a little bit of an overview of the
economic environment for Latin American issuers, and then briefly touch
on current trends, some historical trends, and sort of where the markets
are today for issuers of debt and equity in Latin America.
I just want to overview and put things in context. Sam provided a
map. I also wanted to give a sense of the relative size of these economies.
People talk about Latin America, but in at least for our institution, and I
think this is true generally for investment banks, there really is a big three
of Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.
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This next chart shows total market capitalization, which gives some
proxy for the depth of the local financial system in each of the countries.
The lineup is pretty much the same with one notable exception which is the
Chile, although much smaller in terms of its GDP, comes in third place in
terms of market capitalization, which is kind of a surprising result. But,
again, to follow up on a theme that Sam mentioned, I think there are a
number of reasons for that, but I think at the very top of the list has to be
pension reform. I think liberalization in the Chilean economy, in general,
but the pension reforms have created a liquid local market for issuers of
equity and of debt. That has created a much, much deeper market than
you would normally expect to find, given the size of the Chilean economy.
And if you look on the equity side, companies that have their
American depository receipts, which is the form that most foreign
companies list their equity in the United States, Chile has a
disproportionate number listed in New York, a somewhat surprising and
counter intuitive result. As Sam also mentioned, these economies,
obviously, are all growing. Morgan Stanley's estimates over 4 percent for
the 1997 GDP growth rate, including, in the case of Mexico, which is,
obviously, still pulling out from what was. I think people forget how deep
and painful the recession that Mexico went through. All of these countries
continue to be back on track and growing. These are large economies that
are growing at a clip certainly faster than the OECD countries. That
creates a very positive environment for investment and for equity
investment, in particular.
The final chart on the macroeconomic sector shows inflation rates in
each of these countries, which is obviously one of the main investment
risks for anyone in the region. Obviously, in the case of Argentina, there
was no inflation at all last year, and this year the inflation rate is under 3
percent. Brazil is a country that obviously, until quite recently, was
hyperinflationary. That's also been brought down to single digit numbers.
Mexico is somewhat the unusual case. Huge spike in inflation,
although still double digit inflation, which by historical Latin American
standards is not too bad. That's come down; although, it is still obviously
the highest of any of the three big economies in the region. This shows the
historical 10-year U.S. treasury yield, going back quite a long way, back
to 1973. And I think the point here is just to put in context the issuances.
Whether debt or equity, I think we need to take a step back and look at the
debt and equity markets, in general, over a long-term perspective, and
what you will see is despite in very recent weeks an uptake in interest
rates, on a very long-term historical rates, we are operating, and have been
operating for a while, in a very benign interest rate environment. This is
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an environment where the cost of money is at relatively low levels, and
that's been part of the impetus for some of the issuance on the debt side
This similar chart shows what is called the spread over U.S.
treasuries, which is the incremental amount that corporate borrowers have
to pay over to the U.S. Government borrowing costs for a 30-year
instrument, based on different degrees of rating for investment-grade
credits. The bottom line is for triple A credits, so the very, very best
corporate credits, and you will see that those spreads have tightened to
where now the very, very best credits can borrow at about 50 basis points,
or half a percentage point in terms of interest higher than what the U.S.
Government borrows at. Again, very favorable interest rate environment,
which also carries over into the Latin American context.
This one is, for those of you who are fortunate enough to have
invested in the U.S. stock market for the last couple of years, is rely quite
a remarkable, probably the most remarkable fact that I am going to review
today. But, again, one that has direct impact on what is going on in Latin
America. It's the increase over about the last 12 years in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average, and obviously a tremendous run-up, particularly the
last two years. It is something as an investment banker in Latin America,
trying to bring issuers to market is something we have to contend with
constantly, convincing investors, whether they're equity investors or debt
investors, to make an investment. At the end of the day it is a volatile and
risky asset class when returns like this are available in more developed
markets.
Now, whether, as we speak today, putting fresh money into the Dow
Jones index, or into the Mexican index is a riskier investment is something
everyone can make a decision about. I would like to say a little more
about that little later on.
But this is a salient fact that we face every day, whether we're out
trying to pitch new business, or whether we're taking a company out on
a road show. In terms of general -- I would like to shift now and say a
little bit about debt, what is going on in the debt capital markets, then I
will shift to the equity capital markets. As Sam mentioned, issuance hit a
record high in 1996, it was a banner year for Latin American public debt
issuances at $53 billion. Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, were not surprisingly
the main issuers here. These number are from Securities Data
Corporation. They're a little different from Sam's. One of the things
about working in this region is that you take data cum grana solice
(phonetic), you take the best data you can. Data on this region rarely
agrees from two different sources, but I think that the trends that we will
see are pretty much consistent.
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The profile of issuers continues to change. Sovereigns continue to be
the most important issuers, particularly the sovereigns and
sovereign-related entities from Mexico and Argentina. But what you will
see is an increase of corporates, and I think that is one of the most
important developments over the last two years. It is not only the amount
of the debt that is coming from Latin corporate issuers, but the way
investors are looking at corporate debt from Latin America. Euro bonds
continue to be the main bread and butter of the business, but U.S. public
and global transactions, which would be the kind that I would typically get
involved in, are increasing in importance. Registered so-called Yankee
deals in the United States, and 144(a) high yield transactions are going to
be increasingly common.
I guess the most striking increase, even though more striking than the
huge increase in the size of issuance in 1996, has been what's happened
to the maturity profile, which has increased, I believe, three fold from year
end 1995.
Finally, just the very, very recent events, obviously there's a fair
amount of turmoil in the interest rate environment here, obviously that will
have an affect on the Latin markets. But I think that the trends that are
going on in Latin America are a bit longer-term trends, so there can be a
little bit of a decoupling between what is going on in U.S. interest rate
environment and what it means for a Latin issuer.
The next shows the trend over the last few years in issuance from --
for all forms of debt from Latin America. It shows nice steady growth, but
the 1995 to 1996 shows a really quite dramatic increase. Part of that is
due to the general recovery, I think, of the environment for Latin issuers.
Part of it has to do with the fact that interest rates have been so favorable,
and part, I think, has to do with the fact that now that companies are able
to and governments are able to go further out on a maturity curve, they are
taking advantage of that in more and larger transactions.
This pie chart is actually not new issuances, which was the last graph,
but this is total outstandings, and so this, I think, is a number compiled by
Morgan Stanley Research. This is a very fuzzy number, I think, because
it was quite hard to know what the total outstanding debt from Latin
America is. But, it gives you a rough idea of how it breaks out.
Starting at the top, you have a bank debt, which if you combine with
leverage bank debt, which is the more risky bank borrowers, is about a
quarter of the market. If you group together Brady bonds and the Euro
bond and the Yankees, you have maybe another quarter of the market
Another quarter is the local currency market, which is something we don't
get too involved in, so you tend to forget it, but, obviously, there are local
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banks, and there are in countries like Brazil and Chile, Argentina, local
opportunities to issue in the local capital markets.
Finally, there's the U.S. high yield market, which until very recently
was a purely U.S. junk bond market. Now Latin issuers account for a
quite sizable percentage of total issuances in the high yield -- in the
worldwide high yield market.
And this chart illustrates, I think, that last point in rather dramatic
fashion. If you go back to 1986, the high yield market, the junk bond
market, was a U.S. invention, an invention of U.S. investment bankers,
and had an issue volume of around $46 billion. If you roll the clock ahead
10 years to 1996, you see that there's been some organic growth in the
size of the U.S. market, but fully 40 percent of the total now is accounted
for by the issuers of high yield debt to an international buyer community.
But I think still to a buyer community that is principally located in the
United States, from issuers from Latin America, from Europe and from
Asia.
The whole right side of the second graphic shows a market that just
didn't exist, quite frankly, was not open as a source of financing 10 years
ago. Obviously, that's a great opportunity for investment bankers, but,
also, it's a great opportunity for issuers from this country who have
another outlet to raise capital.
Going back to the big three theme, I think you see in this chart, which
categorizes total debt issuance, you see the same trends in terms of the
overall size, with a big increase from 1995 to 1996. If you add up, the
dark blue, which is Argentina, Brazil, which is red, and the yellow which
is Mexico, I think you get to about 90 percent of the total debt issuances,
from the region at least for 1996.
Now some of these number are skewed by very, very large mega
deals from sovereigns or sovereign related entities that skew the data. But
I think that this shows you why, when you talk to investment bankers, and
when you see how an investment bank approaches the region, so much of
the focus is on those three countries. Then, within those three countries,
a lot of the focus on the side of the business which involves marketing our
services and trying to be hired as advisors on these transactions involves
focusing on those countries, and on some of the larger deals on the debt
side, the big global bond offeringson the equity side, the privatization. In
investment banking, that is known as elephant hunting, and these are the
elephants that get hunted. And, obviously, the process of selecting an
advisor is a very complex one for those sorts of transactions. But you see
there is a tremendous concentration in those countries and in the larger.
In terms of the kind of debt that is issued, this is just cutting the pie
along a different parameter. The blue part of the chart is the Euro public
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market, which, again, has always been, and continues to be, the biggest
part of the market with the public. U.S. public or global bonds offerings,
the red portion, which was quite small relative to the Euro bond amount
of 1993, 1994 and 1995, very significant, still a minority in 1996, and the
first quarter for 1997 shows an even more dramatic increasing of the
public or global bond segment of the business.
And, then, finally, the same set of data, but cut along the nature of
the issuer. Not surprisingly, governments, and government-related
entities, which are the green and the yellow bars, represent the lion's share
of the issuances. And that's probably going to continue to be the case for
some time into the future.
What's interesting in terms of a trend, I think is if you look at the red
bar, which was the corporate issuers of debt. That's widened up
considerably from 1995 to 1996, from 5 to about 12 billion in new
issuances. Already, you know, at or about that rate on a run rate based
on the first quarter of 1997. So that is a trend that we're obviously
watching very closely, because the government and government agency
issue, although it is a very large issue and do very large transactions.
There are only a finite number of governments in Latin America.
On the corporate side, there's a much larger opportunity of potential
issuers, and there's no reason why that corporate sector couldn't grow to
become as large or larger than the government or government-related
entities given enough time. This is, perhaps, in addition to the doubling of
size in the last year, is the most remarkable change of the dead landscape
for Latin issuers.
The scale on the right shows the average weighted maturity in years,
the period of time that issuers can borrow money for in the public markets.
That has increased in 1995 when it was around three or four to over an
average, this is an average now which is a remarkable thing, of over 12.
So there are companies and governments that are out borrowing 20-year
money or beyond, and that's a very unusual development, obviously.
If you said why is that happening, I think it is happening because they
can for the first time borrow such long-dated paper. And I also think, if
you look back to what happened in the Mexican peso crisis, there was a
decision made to borrow shorter term, and in the short term there were
interest rate savings, that were earned by the Mexican government and by
Mexican borrowers borrowing on the shorter end of the maturity scale,
and then refinancing and taking refinancing risks.
At the time, it seemed like a rather savvy strategy, saving 150, 200
basis points by borrowing two years instead of five years. Lo and behold,
the devaluation came, and the strategy of rolling over that paper, that was
not an on option anymore. They had maturities that were coming due,
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inflation went through the roof, local interest rates went through the roof.
A lot of companies never really recovered from the financial shock of that,
some of those were able to refinance, in local markets, maturing
short-term paper, but at tremendous financial cost.
So I think that there is a more, you know, healthy, longer-term view
of what the capital structure should be and that there should be a tiering
of short, medium and longer term debt instruments on any company's or
government's for that matter, balance sheet.
Now, this one will take a little explanation, but it is another trend that
I think is quite novel, and I think really began occurring last year and this
year. The scale on the left shows the spread to the sovereign benchmark,
again in basis points, or one-hundredth of a percentage point. Those are
negative numbers, the sovereign benchmark would be for the same
maturity of the sovereign instrument, what the sovereign in each of these
countries can borrow at. And we have seen a number of deals, Benobros
(phonetic) in Mexico, TMM in Mexico, National Power in the Philippines,
Pedoscom Bank (phonetic) in Argentina, Cofemsa (phonetic) in Mexico,
where these corporates borrowed at rates for the same maturity at less than
the rate that the government could borrow at. That is quite an
accomplishment, and it says a lot about what those companies are, what
the credit standing of the company is, and the cash flows of the company.
And it also says a lot of about investor perception. It says a little bit
about the rating agencies. What it means is that companies will be -- I
won't go so far as to say that they will be disassociated from the country
that they are incorporated in or where most of their business is derived
from, but increasingly there is a tendency to look at companies in this part
of the world. First, to look at them as the companies they are, and
secondly as the country that they happen to be located in. That is a subtle
change from the way that they were looked at before, but is one that is
very, very significant, and represents a lot of money, and a lot of savings
to potential issuers.
This is a simplistic way of making that same point, but investment
bankers like to simplify things as much as possible. Back in the good old
days, which were more expensive, if you had a great company, you looked
at it as, well, it is Argentina, and there happens to be a world class
company located in it. Increasingly, companies like Pedoscom Bank or
Cofemsa say it is a world class company, it just so happens that it is in
Argentina or Mexico or wherever.
And, although this is in the debt part of my talk, I think the same
increasingly goes for unity investments. Before turning to the equity side,
just very briefly, in the package of materials that were sent out, there are
some summary sections from some recent deals.
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Not to spend much time on this, but to give you a flavor of the kind
of deals out there, this is a transaction that I worked on recently, close to
the very beginning part of the year. Pedoscom Bank is based in
Argentina, but has operations throughout South America. It is an oil and
gas E&P company. It has a balance sheet that has billions of dollars of
proven reserves on it, it has an interest coverage ratio of about eight times
cash flow to interest expense. It is an investment grade issuer, it just
happens to be located in Argentina. The issue is rated B one double B
minus, which was a sovereign capped rating. In other words, it would
have been based on its cash flows rated higher, but it was sort of held back
by the rating of the country.
We managed to get it priced at 38 basis points, or about almost half
a percentage point cheaper than the corresponding (inaudible) sovereign
bond. And it matured in 2004, so, you know, medium-term or
longer-term dated paper. It was priced when we went out on the road at
200 million, and it was increased in size to 300. I think there was nominal
demand in the book for over a billion dollars worth of these bonds.
People were willing to look at the financial strength of the balance
sheet and the cash flows, and, essentially, price it and buy these bonds.
Again, not disregarding the fact that they are in Argentina, but I think
ascribing a secondary importance to the fact that this was an Argentine
company.
Another recent transaction, which is interesting, shows, I think, the
direction that the market is going is a deal we did for a company called
Intech Corporation, actually a Delaware corporation. It is an emerging
telecom company, business in Argentina, Venezuela, Columbia, several
other companies, Mexico and several other countries in South America.
This, as an emerging telecom company that's spent a lot of money on
developing infrastructure had a shakier balance sheet, it was a riskier
credit. The spread to treasuries was about 200, 300 basis points higher
than for the Pedescom bank deal at 550 points over, but they were also
able to issue seven-year notes with a single bullet maturity at the end.
And what was interesting is that the company, if you looked at this
company, it looked an awful lot like a high yield company in the United
States or France or anywhere else. It is in an industry that's growing very
fast. It eats cash to build a network, and it was largely sold to the same
people who would have been buying telecoms plays in the United States,
PCS providers, cell phone providers and the like. It was looked at,
marketed, and taken on the road show to largely the same group of
investors. So, again, a kind of convergence to the way you would look at
the same investment if it had been principally a U.S. based company. And
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in the handouts, there's some summaries sections from the prospectuses
from those deals.
Turning to trends in the equity capital markets, frankly, I would say
what's going on in the equity capital markets is a little bit more -- a little
less monumental in the sorts of changes. Those changes that I discussed
about breaking through the Sovereign barrier, and the maturity may not
sound like C changes, but they really are quite important. What I should
have done, and didn't do, is try to quantify some of the interest savings for
a typical borrower that that can represent, but it really represents a huge
change on the debt side.
I would say there have been some important developments on the
equity side, but what is really new and novel in Latin America in capital
markets is, at least in the last year and a half or so, has been on the debt
side. Capital markets, obviously very favorable U.S. equity dynamics
from strong new issue market, until quite recently where it has weakened
on increased volatility. Cash flows into the international funds have been
very strong. Latin America still continues to represent only a small
percentage of total flows in international funds, but it is a growing
percentage.
International investors are really looking for a new growth
opportunity, and I think there's a lot of nervous money that's invested in
the United States that wants to redeploy. There are a lot of pension funds,
institutional investors, money managers who are under weight in Latin
America and emerging markets generally. And, as you will see in second,
Latin America in the last few years in emerging markets have been serious
under performers vis-a-vis the United States. So there is natural tendency
to try to rotate out from the United States assets and into international and
emerging markets, which is a trend we hope will continue.
In terms of valuation, Latin America continues to be within the
emerging markets world, relatively cheap in terms of valuations, and
certainly cheaper than the Asia tigers. And I think that there is sort of a
guarded bullishness on Latin America, particularly in the three principal
countries, where signs seem to be positive. Although, there's always sort
of an inherent fragility in the environment, I think the general feeling is
bullish toward the region, as we will see in a second.
There's been quite a rally staged over the last year or so in Latin
equities, in particular. Briefly, this illustrate funds flow, I believe those are
in the 500 million. The first line, I believe those are on a weekly basis.
Net flows, the amount that went into international funds, less the amount
that went out of international funds. So it's been positive for quite a long
time. Only a very few even weeks where there was a net outflow, people
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taking money out of international funds. That's reasonably good proxy for
what was happening in Latin America.
Although, I think we rolled it back a little bit further to take into
account the Mexican peso crisis, you would see a large net outflow in the
months immediately after that. Not a good time to take money out, it was
a good time to put money in, as you will see in the slide coming up.
This just illustrates the pickup in Latin American new issue equity
volume in 1996. 1 think this covers the same period as for the debt chart
and shows, generally, similar trends, substantial pickup expected in 1997.
A lot of very, very large transactions in the pipeline.
A huge increase from 1995 were to a very large extend because of the
fallout of the Mexican crisis. Latin American equity markets were pretty
much closed down. It was a miserable year for investment bankers in
Latin America. And, if you plotted bonuses for Latin American
investment bankers, it would be highly correlated with that same chart.
1995 was a year to forget.
I think it does show, seriously, for the debt and equity side, but
particularly for the equity side, that the windows open and close, and it is
very binary, I think in Latin America, whereas for the U.S. markets,
international markets outside of the emerging markets, there can be times
to be sellers and times not, and times when markets are buoyant and
valuations would be better, and times when it's less so. But, in Latin
America, there are times you can do a deal, and other times you cannot do
a deal at any price. You can't go out and we wouldn't advise to go out.
That inspires a lot of the advice to Latin clients, given the lead time to get
a transaction up and running. Once everything is ready, once the
disclosure is together, the accounting is together, and the markets, the
windows is open. Our advice tends to go and sort of take the money
when you can, because there are periods, and 1995 was a brutal example
of that, when the window just shuts. It is better to raise money when you
can, and use it when you need it then to assume that the window will
always be open.
This shows, from the beginning of January of 1996, index
performance of each of the main indices in Latin America. So it is an
index of indices all back to 100 at the beginning of the year. The top line
is the Ebavespa (phonetic), the Brazilian, principal Brazilian stock market
index. So that's obviously had a tremendous run this year. The bottom
line is Chile, which has been the relative under performer. Chilean
markets have tended to be richly valued and they have corrected a little
bit. The jumble in the middle includes the other main markets, as well as
the Morgan Stanley capital international free index, which is a market cap
weighted proxy for the entire region. Buried in that jumble is also the
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S&P 500. So the returns have been, you know, sizable, around 20 percent
or so, but not particularly outstripping the S&P over the same period.
Now, this is maybe a more telling chart on relative performance and
relative under performance of Latin American assets. The blue line shows
the S&P 500, going back, in this case, further back to the beginning of
1994. The brown line shows the Latin American free index. If you had
your money in Latin American equities, for that period of time, over three
years, you would have earned a total return of 10 percent. You probably
would have been better off to have your money in your local bank in a
savings account. Obviously, a little more fun along the way, and a little
more risk attached to the investment here.
To a certain extent, you can play with a starting date on these indices,
so it is a little bit of a trick of the trade. The change would be even more
pronounced, I think, if you had started at the beginning or toward the end
of 1994. But it does illustrate this point, that this is not done in a void,
and we are trying to raise capital for risky ventures in one of the main
risky parts of the world. By comparison to what's been going on in the
United States, which has its own dynamic, and I don't purport to
understand it, it makes the business of raising capital for our issuers. If
you showed the non-Japan Asian indices you would see pretty much the
same scoring.
Another point just to make here, if it looks pretty for higher investors
in this asset class, on the other hand, if you have the nerves of steel to
invest at the year of the fallout of the peso crisis, in early 1995, since that
period of time, you would have over doubled your money. So I guess it
just says there's something to market timing, that totally discredited theory
of investing, But in this case, for this asset class, it would have yielded
quite sizable return. But for the long-term investors, people who have
been in this asset class since before the crisis, we have only now, despite
this huge run-up, in this last year, year and a half,, only back up of pretty
(inaudible) scoring quite frankly for long-term investors.
In terms of valuation (inaudible) I think it shows that (inaudible)
increasingly overpriced and overheated world market financial assets. A
very typical negative of (inaudible) that element was the ratio of the stock
price to either historical (inaudible) projected earnings for 1997,
(inaudible) but best markets in increasingly overprice, overheated world
market (inaudible) financial assets.
A very typical evaluation (inaudible) ratio of the top price to either
historical or in this case projected earnings for 1997, varies from country,
(inaudible) but if you aggregate the whole countries (inaudible), you will
see that countries like Argentina traded at about 15 times, Brazil 13 times,
and so forth. In the U.S., the S&P 500 is trading close to 19 times
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earnings, and the Japanese (inaudible) even higher than that. So in terms
of growth at a reasonable price, it seems to be one of the most attractively
priced asset classes in the world.
(Inaudible) the total issuance amount of equity (inaudible) on the debt
side, you will see a similar story, with a couple of observations that,
again, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico historically have dominated
(inaudible).
(Inaudible) 1996, for example, you see another category, it's huge,
and I believe what's (inaudible) in that main transaction of a billion plus
deals for privatization, the telecom numbers as well in Peru. Again,
countries that don't tend to be the focus of the coverage (inaudible)
investment bank, except as it relates to these, you know, very, very large
transactions (inaudible) quite a bit.
(Inaudible) a lot of the focus is on (inaudible), because of the state of
privatizations (inaudible) which is (inaudible), and a whole series of very,
very large privatizations. And just to sort of wrap up our case study
(inaudible) handouts, transaction we did back at the end of last year
(inaudible), which is the largest cable operator in Brazil, and the only pure
cable (inaudible) in Latin America, (inaudible) very, very small cable
(inaudible), a fairly large transaction, I believe it was priced about
(inaudible) it was priced (inaudible) private company, private transaction,
had generated a huge amount of enthusiasm, I would say almost (inaudible)
which hadn't been seen, I think, since the equity transactions that were
done just before the Mexican peso crisis. So I think it showed, at least for
me, it was sort of a sign of a return to normalcy and some health in tow
back in the market.
Everything that is an indicator of successful transaction, successful
outcome (inaudible). The size of the offering is slightly, it was priced at
the high end of the range, (inaudible), in this case which was priced at
$14, which is a very (inaudible) range. The (inaudible) issuing shares
sufficient, demands to (inaudible), so it was a very successful transaction,
and I think (inaudible) a deal, (inaudible) the first deal since the Mexican
crisis, but a series of deals that we've done that (inaudible) generate and
characterize (inaudible), but they were nothing to crow about the next pitch
to the client. This one was something of very, very favorable terms
(inaudible), and in this case the exact number, the demand (inaudible).
Show a breakdown of the (inaudible) Latin America at least
(inaudible), here tends to be dominated by telecom, banks, financial
institutions, and credit institutions, and manufacturers, which (inaudible)
the utilities, they tend to be the biggest enterprises in their countries, the
biggest users of capital, and they also tend to be the object of privatization
throughout the region.
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And, again, privatization transactions (inaudible) because of their size
(inaudible) on a number of transactions, including (inaudible), plus larger
number of (inaudible) smaller deals in the telecom area, for example,
smaller (inaudible) very, very large transactions.
That pretty much wraps up my talk for today. I guess, in conclusion,
one of the things I would say in terms of overall trends is a certain degree
of convergence of debt and equity side (inaudible) issuers in the United
States or anywhere else in the world. It is, for better or worse, becoming
less of (inaudible). The investors afew years ago looked at this as a Latin
(inaudible), something unusual coming across the desk. Now they look at
it as a (inaudible) issuer, another (inaudible) part of a world.
If that makes (inaudible) a little less exotic, a little less exciting, that's
probably a small price to pay (inaudible) part of the world to be taken at
face value (inaudible). Thank you.
MR. CONE: A real sign of how mature the market is, is how the writing
agencies treat securities, and we are quite privileged to have with us today
from Standard & Poors James Penrose. He will talk to us about the
writing of project finance issues in Latin America.
MR. PENROSE: Well, good afternoon. Although, I am a lawyer, I have
been asked to substitute for Bill Chew, who is the head of the Project
Finance Department at Standard & Poors, and his subject originally was
project financing in Latin America, and with the liberty extended to those
people who substitute at short notice, I have expanded the topic a little bit
to talk about rating project finances in Latin America. I did so for two
reasons: First, because it is what we do; and, secondly because as
bankers, lawyers, students of the subject, you realize that capital markets
eventually mean ratings, and that's the connection.
A health warning. The rating agency is not an expert on any
particular point. Banking, engineering, project operation, commodities
pricing, these sorts of things we look to other parties for. I am also not
really in a position, so I can't answer in any detail about the sort of
questions about which pump is a better thing to be using in a particular
mine.
The other point that I would make is that I am not really in a position
to talk about our rating of individual projects or individual sponsors,
sovereigns, even though I am happy to listen to your complaints in that
regard.
So the first slide that 1 have here is rating of project finance
transactions in Latin America. And I thought it might be an idea to break
the talk down to the three indicated areas there: What a rating is, what we
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look at as project finance transactions, and then just touching the Latin
American aspect of these things at end. Even though I am going to be
talking about Latin America, I may be making references not just to Latin
America but to other countries, as well, because it may be more
appropriate to talk about the rating process there.
We have rated six -- publicly rated some six transactions in Latin
America: Two pipelines in Columbia, three power projects, and an
airport, the second runway of the Bogota Airport. Our project financing,
in other areas of the world, is much more extensive, in Asia and the
Middle East and in Europe, where we have rated almost a hundred deals.
So that's why I would like the liberty to bring in other examples.
So, quickly, what a rating is, is a financial editorial. We arrive at a
rating by presentation of information about an issue and an issuer to a
rating committee which decides what the particular strength of the issuer
is, its ability to repay a debt obligation on time and in full. To put it more
crudely, if repayment is a day late or a dollar short, it is in default.
The ratings are useful. They have market credibility, because they
are, apparently, disinterested assessments of the ability to service debt.
Rating agencies generally are not in the position of selling bonds. The
market looks to them because they're disinterested. We rate according to
what we are called criteria, which are legal and analytical benchmarks,
risk identification mechanisms, that we look for in projects and try to
address by commenting on the project structure and honest economics.
Project ratings generally have legal and analytical components, and
often they're two sides of the same coin. S&P's practice of breaking a
particular risk into its legal and analytical components was ground breaking
at the time, though I believe other rating agencies do it now. In terms of
legal factors, there are basically two. It is a creation of a clear obligation
to pay through the project documents; and, also, the safeguards that we
have in the project structure to insure that cash flows don't go astray. The
legal analysis, as I say, is supposed to establish clearly that there's an
unequivocal obligation by the issuer, or the guarantor, as the case may be,
or the project off-take to meet his obligation.
One distinction I should make, at some point I will be talking about
project documents versus transaction documents or financing documents.
What we mean by the project document, or a project document, are all
those documents it takes, off-take agreements, equity contribution
agreements, those sorts of things that get the project up and running. By
financing documents, what I mean is a capital market's transaction, or a
bank loan, the thing that actually finances the document. So when I talk
about project documents those are the things that exist in the territory, in
the host country. When I talk about financing documents, I mean the
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offering statement, the indenture, the intercreditor agreements, those sorts
of things that the issuer enters into, its contract with the holders of the
notes.
Generally, when we rate a deal, we do a documentary analysis, which
is what I just suggested was the analysis of the obligation to pay, and the
exceptions to that obligation, as well as a number of other things. The
structural analysis, which is a type of bankruptcy analysis, the security
interest provision, which leads the rating agency, as well as investors, to
understand where their claim on the collateral lies; and, of course, the
overall legality of the transaction.
In other words, does the deal work? is the rating right? am I going to
get my money? and is it you will legal? Now, in terms of cash flow
analysis, this is what we traditionally term the analytical side. For
projects, the analytical side is a six or seven point analysis, having to do
with whether the project is going to get built; whether it is going to work,
whether the person who is going to be buying the project output is still
going to be around; whether the suppliers to the project, if it is for a
power project, for example, if the gas supplier or the coal supplier, if he
is still going to be around, and if his prices are going to stay stable; the
pricing risk, which is another way of saying what the output risk is; and
the sovereign risk, which is, basically, the risk that the host country is
going to interfere with the repatriation of debt service payments, or
otherwise interfere with the importation of goods or other things necessary
to operate the project.
Now, just to quickly touch on construction risk, what the analyst will
look at in construction risk is whether the engineering design, selection
of technology, is appropriate to that particular country. He looks to see
if the builder or builders are experienced parties in that area of the world.
For example, in the TransGas transaction, which was a pipeline that
went from just outside of Bogota to Calli (phonetic). It is nothing more
than a gigantic straw that goes for some 300 kilometers. The gas pressure
in that area of the world is so high you don't need compressors or
anything. You just punch a hole in the ground, stick it onto the pipe, and
let it rip down to Calli. What made the construction of this particular
transaction difficult, is because there is a mountain range in between
Bogota and Calli called the Andes. At times, the pipe had to go 5 or
6,000 miles straight up.
There are only a couple companies in the world that can build in those
sorts of conditions, and the construction risks for the pipe was taken by a
French construction company that had built over the Alps, and had done
another bit of work down in the Andes. So what enabled that particular
project to get to investment grade was the ability of a top-flight builder,
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who had experience in that area of the world, and who was willing to put
his name, as well as a bunch of liquidated damages in the building
contract, on the line.
Technological and operating risk. It's like construction risk, except
that we assume that the project is built. For technological and operating
risk, for a power plant, for example, one wants to use proven technology.
If it is a gas-fired turbine plant, you use a jet engine that has several
hundred thousand hours of operating history behind it to insure that if this
thing sheds a blade that the plant is not going to go down for four months
while the whole thing has to be rebuilt.
To go back to the TransGas transaction, the Columbia pipeline
transaction, there the off-taker, which was the Columbia petroleum
company, gave a blanket guaranty that no matter what the commodity price
of the gas was that they were selling out of the project that, they would
make payments sufficient to retire principal and interest on the debt. For
gas contracts, it is easy. Electrical power plants, the issues can be a little
more difficult. And, generally, one looks to the Sovereign, or to the equity
to absorb the pricing risk, or the off-take risk. If more power plants get
built and the price of power falls, a guarantor has to pick that up, because
bondholders generally are reluctant to take that sort of risk.
Lastly, sovereign risk. I will get into that a little bit under a more
legal area that we call currency risk. But, in sovereign risk, we have two
components: They are political risk and legal risk. Generally, you want
to know, if you're an analyst looking at this stuff, that the political risk,
at least, that the government is behind the project, that it fits into some
sort of master plan that they have, that at some point down the road that
they are not going to lose interest.
The other thing that we look at is what the market demand is for the
particular product. Now, practically speaking, when we rate these deals
at Standard & Poors, I mention to you that we have a legal component to
it. What I do is I look at project structure. Because most of these
financing documents are under New York law, I look at the financing
documents, and I look at the intercreditor stuff and overall legality of the
New York law govern documents.
The local counsel, who may be in Columbia or in Chile, looks at
things like the security interest over the project. He looks at the local law
documentary issues, and he also looks at any other thing that might
somehow or other interfere with cash flow. That's what I mean by kitchen
sink down there at the bottom. Are all the permits and approvals there,
have they been arranged? Is the tax regime clearly enough stated that we
are not going to have a nasty surprise in a couple of years. These are the
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sorts of things we ask for, and we generally get them in opinion form. So,
practically speaking, that's how the legal side shakes out.
What I mean by project finance transaction is typically an
infrastructural, if you pardon the anecdote, capital asset; roads, power
plants. But more recently we have been seeing things like mines,
pipelines, airports, liquid natural gas projects, cement factories, these sorts
of things.
The project itself, that hard asset, including the contract for its
operation, construction, maintenance, off-take. It is the whole bundle, the
asset plus the thing that makes, money, all of which are contained in a
legal structure, being the project company, permitting the asset -- and that
legal structure permits the asset, legal structure, plus the project, plus the
contracts, permit the asset to generate revenues, and the structure also has
the important function of protecting the contracts and the project itself
from extraneous risk. The purchase price of the project is generally raised
by sale of bonds, at least in capital market transactions, to investors to
whom the project is pledged. There are exceptions to all this stuff, but
this is for purposes of making a quick description of what a project is.
And the last thing about projects, of course, is that these are
nonrecourse, which means that the investors look only to the project, plus
its revenues, for repayment. They can't get to the equity unless the equity
allows that by means of a guaranty, or some other mechanism like that. I
want to talk for a minute or two about what the difference is between a
corporate obligation, an asset-backed obligation, and a project are. It is
important because investors are left holding different bags when deals go
down. And a corporate debt is traditionally the thing that we all in law
school learned about, and we all, for the first four years of our legal lives,
worked on.
Corporate debt is generally an unsecured obligation, issued by a
corporation supported by its general credit. There is no particular pledge
of a particular asset generally. It's unstructured, meaning that the risk on
the note, the rating on the note is going to be the same as the rating of the
corporation.
Moderate leverage, you rarely get a corporate borrower boosting itself
all the way, borrowing everything that it can. And the rating on a
corporate debt obligation is based on, as I mentioned before, its general
credit, those diverse strengths of the corporation. So for Time Warner it
is based all those. Our rating on Time Warner is based on the strength of
all those myriad of individual companies that all feed money into Time
Warner, not any particular obligation.
Now, an asset-backed debt instrument is something different. What
I am talking about here are things like mortgage-backed receivables,
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auto-loan receivables. Sometimes what I do, things like funeral home
receivables. Here the differences begin to start.
The difference between an asset-backed debt and a corporate
obligation is that with asset-backed debt you look at a specific pool of
assets. They're generally financial or accounting assets, like receivables.
The way we rate them is by what is called a pool analysis, and the pool
analysis tries to figure out mathematically what the chance of the whole
pool collapsing, or enough of the pool to default the rating collapsing, is.
These are structured deals, which means, because you are looking at
the pool of assets, you don't want anyone else's credit to enter the picture,
to sort of drop into the punch bowl. You are looking just at that pool of
assets, so you have to protect it from external things like the sponsor's
insolvency.
Investors generally require high ratings, because they don't understand
how these things work, and because the models that have been designed
have always emphasized the quality of these assets. And, lastly, in those
deals where, like, for failed real estate financing securitizations, credit
enhancement is required from some other source. Or in commercial paper
deals where you are looking at a pool of assets and there may be a timing
risk, one looks to a highly rated bank to make up for that timing risk.
Remembering what I've said before, that the rating has a timeliness
component, as well as a fullness component.
Finally we arrive at project finance. It is a combination of the
corporate debt and the asset-backed debt. And to the extent that it is a
physical asset you are looking to, because this thing has to generate
electricity or allow planes to land on it, and at same time it throws off, or
it depends on a contractual obligation that is feeding into it, such as the
off-take agreement, the guy who's buying the electricity.
The peculiar thing about projects is that they are financially
engineered to low investment grade. Now, what investment grade and
non-investment grade means, for those who are not practicing, these are
not rating agency terms. These are regulatory terms. And what low
investment grade, the difference between investment grade and low
investment grade, as I understand it, is that, for investment grade,
insurance companies, pension funds, people like this, can buy that paper,
generally with fewer restrictions on them by their regulators, than if they
bought non-investment grade paper, where their portfolio is restricted to
just a percentage, or a dollar amount of non-investment-grade paper.
It is not to say that non-investment-grade stuff, otherwise known as
junk, isn't good, because there are an awful lot of fabulous non-investment
grade transactions. It is just for one reason or another they haven't made
it quite up to the area where we can call them investment grade.
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The rating is sui generous, and by that I mean that we can't use a
pool, we can't look at the general strength of the corporation. Project
finance is based on the interplay of a number of odd things, the strength
of the off-take, the strength of the structure, the amount of equity that the
project sponsors dumped into the project to show his good faith and his
willingness to stay with the project for the long term.
Overall, from the project perspective, the analyst has two big
questions that he asks. First, do we need the project? And when he asks
that question, he looks at project economics, markets and regulation.
The first thing is project economics. That is a look, basically, at the
present. How does this project stack up against other projects that we
have on the ground right now? Are there more airports around where
these airplanes can go and land, that are cheaper than the particular airport
that we have just financed?
The second issue he looks at, under project economics, is, does the
cost of construction and the operating expense of this thing warrant it?
Can we be sure that once this thing is up and running we are not going to
have cost overruns, that the technology is good enough. In a pipeline that
has compressors, the compressors aren't going to blow every three
minutes, that the monitoring devices to measure the gas going through the
things work, they have present technology, or are we going to have down
time, are we going to loose product, those sorts of issues.
And the third thing under project economics is the off-take, the
amount of money that we expect is going to come in from an off-take. Is
that a reasonable assumption. Are people going to continue to pay this
amount for the particular project off-take? Markets is more of a future,
forward-looking area. For markets, we worry, is the demand for the
project going to continue?
Generally, because you are looking at infrastructural things, like
roads, where you have road studies. For example, in China, when the
Beijing toll road was built, when the (inaudible) Expressway was built, and
the Juhi Road (phonetic) were built, there were studies that we had by
three or four traffic engineering firms that said basically, if you build that
highway there, it will shortly become a gigantic parking lot, because the
demand for these roads is so strong.
Those are the sorts of studies that you look to for comfort, to insure
that the market for this particular product and its output are going to
continue to be as attractive as they are in issuing.
I will just talk about the last thing there, regulations and government
support. I touched on that before. The idea is how important is the
project to the government. Also public support. For the TransGas issue,
down in Columbia a couple of years ago, one of the things we were very
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worried about were terrorists. Because at least one part of this pipeline
ran through an area that was traditionally a poor area of Columbia,
analysts were worried that a stick underneath a section of the pipe would
be a problem.
Also, because Columbia also exports oil, and oil pipelines are fabulous
targets for terrorists because the oil goes offshore and oil represents
everything that is bad about foreigners. But for a gas pipeline, this wasn't
quite true, because all the gas was being used internally in Columbia. The
gas wasn't being squeezed down to a liquid, it wasn't going offshore, it
was being used in various households in the Calli area. And, on one or
two occasions where somebody mistook a gas pipe for an oil pipe, the
public outrage was considerably higher than it was for an oil pipeline
explosion. This sort of anecdotal evidence gives some sort of comfort that
public support for a particular project is there.
The last thing you look at, if you are a analyst, under the heading of
governmental stuff, is does the government have a policy of privatization
in that particular area for power, especially in the power area, and what
is the potential for change in regulation.
The second issue that the analyst asks himself is has the given project
risk been given to the entity best able to deal with that risk. From the
rating agency perspective, the answer is bondholders don't like risk. They
don't like it at all. And so for things like force majeure, which is the
ability of a party not to perform under a contract, under a given
circumstance, at least Standard & Poors likes to allocate all force majeure
risk to the equity or to the government, to insure that some creditworthy
source is going to continue to put his or her hand in her pocket, or his
pocket, and keep making debt service payments, not default the debt.
And in trying to figure out whether proper risk allocation has
occurred, there is a credit analysis, which basically means reading all those
project documents, and insuring that the most capable party is dealing with
the particular risk, that the cash flow analysis also withstands various stress
scenarios, such as a terrorist blowing up the line or something, and, lastly,
an overall risk analysis. That's what I will talk about in a couple of
seconds, under the rubric Latin America.
We rate, right now in Latin America, it looks like about 10 countries,
being Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Columbia, Brazil, Uruguay,
Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. You know, one of the things that I wanted
to mention, and I got off in some flight of enthusiasm, is why projects
were structured to just barely investment grade. This is because, when
something is rated at the high end of investment grade, at triple A, that
means that there's very little risk, and it also means that the spreads are
much tighter. If it is too low, if it is down in non-investment grade.
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Then, the spreads are bigger but people can't buy it. So the idea of
engineering this thing to just squeaking over the line to get to triple B
minus is you get the investor the biggest, fattest rate of return you can, as
well as allowing him to stick it into his portfolio and satisfy his regulator.
So that is peculiarity of projects.
Now, in addition to these things like structure risk, enforceability risk,
currency risk, choice of law, environmental, the change of law risk, I
wanted to talk a little bit about political risk, legal risk and sovereign risk,
and just touch briefly on off-take risk..
You remember I told you a few minutes ago that the project and the
documents have to be contained in a structure that has the effect of holding
the thing together and protecting the transaction from external influences.
We have what we call the social contract of nonrecourse, and what that
means is that you, if you, the bondholder, agree to look just to this project
for repayment, we the issuer promise that the only credit risk you are
going to have to bear is the risk of that project, the risk of a parent
insolvency, of a holding company insolvency, of some other unrated or
unaccounted-for party isn't going to screw things up. Now, the way we
try to address structural risk is through techniques that we borrowed from
securitization, and that is basically by creating what we call a
single-purpose entity, or a bankruptcy-remote entity.
When we first started rating these things we were very tizzy about
what we actually demanded out of our issuers, that being things like
independent directors who would vote against bankruptcy; things like
golden shares, which you have to have the consent of every shareholder
to vote into bankruptcy, and you would create one class of shares that you
pop over to the trustee, and allow him to hold that.
We have relaxed on that a little bit now, and, basically, what we ask
for our issuer, and the project company, if they are different, is that you
have a single purpose, and that is basically making sure that that project
is operating. You can buy the gas to burn, you can sell the electricity you
make, you can hirer the employees to do the work on the project, but
that's it. No speculation in pork belly futures. No other sorts of
operations that we are not entertaining in a project rating. It is single
purpose.
The other point that you look to is to insure that the project, or the
issuer, doesn't issue any debt secured by the project revenues that is rated
lower than the debt on the project. The reason for that is because, if you
think of a single A deal, a single A (inaudible) debt and a double B, if
because that double B is subordinated, you start missing payments. There
is an incentive on the double B holders to say, well, hell, I am not going
to get my money, so I better file this guy for bankruptcy.
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It creates an incentive in that lower class. So what you try to do is
insure that all debt holders are, at least from the rating perspective, a pari
passu. No merger or consolidation for the issuer for the project company,
and we try, at least in the higher rated projects, to have some sort of
anti-bankruptcy mechanism. The reason we ask for the independent
director or the golden share is because covenants, a mere agreement, at
least in this country, not to file into bankruptcy isn't worth anything. It
is void as to public policy, so they can say all day long, no, I'm not going
to file, and, yet, when things get hard, the first thing that happens is that
that covenant gets disregarded.
To address this, at least in the securitization context, we try to build
in mechanisms, such as this independent director, who has duty to debt
holders, as well as to shareholders, and the golden share, to try to make
it more difficult. It is not perfect, but we try.
We also try to, in this bankruptcy thing, to get substantive
non-consolidation opinion between the issuing project company and its
parent. Because it is the parents, generally, who are the problem. You're
a parent, and you just sunk $40 million, or you did 10 years ago into the
project company. The project is humming along fine. The parent gets into
trouble and it starts looking around for resources. What does it look to
first? You know, it eats its children. It wants to go after the equity
contribution it made. So it has an incentive to go after the child. That's
why we get a bit sort of skittish about this whole thing about bankruptcy
remoteness.
So here is some Latin American issues. What possibly could be worse
than having to foreclose, and the answer is, of course, having to foreclose
but really not being able to do so. And we look to, of course, the first
thing you look at, when the foreclosure time comes, you look at your
legal, valid, binding and enforceable opinion. Then you go and try to
foreclose and find out that it's really not worth too many because of
various local law issues that you find.
These local law issues have to do with (inaudible) of enforcement,
compliance with local formalities, how does foreclosure work under local
law, these sorts of issues. I will just quickly touch on them. In places
like Argentina and Costa Rica, there are taxes and duties that are payable
on foreclosure. These can often be a huge amount of money, a percentage
of the project value. This sort of thing is a real bummer when -- if you
are looking -- the rating is gone, you are looking to try to get your
investment back, if you're holding this paper, and you find it's been
haircut by 10 percent.
So the legal way you look at this is, you just toss up your hands and
say there's nothing to be done. On the analytical side, though, (inaudible)
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on the analytical side, and the analytical side has to say that this project is
so strong, the demand for this thing is so high, they couldn't possibly go
wrong. It's a leap of faith. It is what we call a business judgment.
The next area is the failure to protocolize (phonetic) or pay stamp
duties. In certain jurisdictions, if you don't pay stamp duties, you can't
bring it into court and say please enforce this contract. We look to local
counsel to insure that, in those jurisdictions where stamp duties are
evidence of admissibility of a document into evidence, that those things are
all done. This is all part of the special legal opinions that a rating agency
will ask for. Prohibitions on foreign land ownership.
You are foreclosing on the property. Unfortunately, now that you have
foreclosed on it, you find that you can't own it, because you are not a
Mexican citizen. In a recent transaction that we had called Petacalco, the
project was put into a special type of civil law trust called a fudes comisio
(phonetic). These things were invented back around the turn of the
century to allow foreign land owners, foreign residence holders, to come
into Mexico and buy vacation homes. Over the years, this is the one
exception that we know of, over the years this fudes comisio, which is like
an owner trust, evolved into having corporate attributes. So the project is
now owned by this fudes comisio, which is controlled by basically the
offshore construction sponsors in equity.
You want to insure that that is the case, of course, because you're
finding a loophole in the general prohibition against foreign land
ownership. One wants to make sure that in a bankruptcy proceeding that
your priority, which means your ranking amongst the various pool of
creditors, is not going to be defeated by a bankruptcy filing, as it can, in
certain circumstances, in this country. And, by the way, one of the
reasons we get so paranoid about bankruptcy is because we all trained in
the United States, which is one of the most debtor-friendly places on the
planet. And we bring, unfortunately, our sort of ugly American
perspective about this thing to other jurisdictions and tend to be very
persnickety about it, at least in the rating agencies, to ensure that these
sorts of ghosts are not going to creep into our transaction.
The fifth item is the inability to perfect on inventory and receivables
in civilian jurisdictions. Civil code jurisdictions have traditionally not
allowed for the creation of security interests in movables or in contract
rights; thus, it is very difficult to get a security interest on a locomotive
down in Mexico because there's no concept of that. And one of the areas
that we worry about, when we do rolling stock financing, rate rolling stock
fimancings, are the new cross border agreements between Mexican




If a particular project is owned by a governmental entity, there is, in
the World Bank standard agreement, I think it is Section 9, a provision that
says that one cannot create a lien on the asset, or on any proceeds of the
asset without World Bank permission. Especially for offshore accounts,
this becomes an important point.
We can move to the next area. This is where I want to talk about
currency risk, which sort of touches on what Chris was talking about, and
what Sam was mentioning earlier. First, a little introduction to what we
call the sovereign ceiling. The sovereign ceiling is a concept of the rating
agencies has that says you cannot rate a corporation or a project or
anything that's based in a host country higher than the host country rating.
So if you have a corporate issuer in Mexico that is rated single A, and
Mexico right now has a double B stable rating, no matter how strong that
particular entity is, you cannot rate that local entity higher. You will be
given a foreign currency double B rating.
There are a couple reasons for this. First, because the sovereign
controls its borders, it, and it alone, can determine legally whether money
crosses those borders. If exchange control restrictions are put in place, if
the sovereign passes a law that says, henceforth all contracts denominated
in U.S. dollars are converted to pecos, and we control the supply of pecos,
than what is an issuer to do?
So that is the theory, the sovereign feeling, is that the sovereign holds
all the cards in times of economic stress. Now, that's not to say that you
can't punch holes in the sovereign ceiling, because you can, and this is
being done with increasing frequency. But I won't talk about that right
now, I'll just talk about currency risk classically.
In general, we worry about currency risk when the analyst goes to a
particular country to find out if the foreign currency reserves of that
particular sovereign are adequate. When I say foreign currency reserves,
I mean dollars, because most of these are denominated in dollars, are
adequate to allow a particular issuer to come with his supply of pecos.
Half the time off-take contracts are denominated in pecos, half the time in
dollars, but you want to make sure, when the issuer comes with his basket
of pecos to the Central Bank, there will be sufficient dollars in some
account so that he can fish those things out and send them to New York
or to the Caymans, whereever the issuer of the paying agent is located.
And so what the analyst will look at, in analytical terms, is the size
and tenor of the sovereign's foreign currency borrowings. Currency
stability, the size of -- in terms of the project, the size of the debt service
reserve, so if there is a temporary hiccup in foreign exchange availability,
there's sufficient money offshore that you can continue to pay. Those are
the sorts of things that we look to.
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Now, so legally what we look to, in the documents and through
various concession agreements or through permits that we received, we
want to know that the issuer, or the project company, has all the legal
conversion rights that it needs, either under law, under regulation, or by
private ruling. Secondly, that you have all exchange control approvals,
and basically what the analyst does there, he goes around to the hacienda,
he goes around to the central bank, he goes around to the exchange control
people, he goes around to customs, and he asks all the people in all the
places whether the deal is clean. Then we get a legal opinion on top of
that.
Registration under money lender laws, that's more of a common law
attribute. And capital importation restrictions, in Columbia, if you bring
in a bunch of money, like over $100 million in a period of less than five
years, one can be subject to withholding tax on that amount of money. So
one has to get legal opinions to the effect that if you are bringing in money
in these sorts of quantities, whether you are going to be paying some sort
of haircut.
Offshore accounts are the same way. You want to make sure that
under local law, under the host country law, that the exchange control
regulations are liberal enough so that offshore accounts can be held by
on-shore residents. Remember back in the '70s and the early '80s it was
a terrible time when exchange control was in place. In a lot of countries,
in Latin America and in Europe, holding an offshore account was a
criminal offense without appropriate authorization, and would void the
transaction.
The next item is first perfect a security interest in all offshore
agreements. Again, this goes to the security interest and the priority of the
bond holder. And the last thing is more governmental approvals. Next
item is the choice of law risk.
For project documents, these being the on-shore documents, what we
worry about is the fact the choice of law clause, because a contract with
a local party is going to be governed by the law of the host country. So
what one needs to do, the governing law is fine, but what one wants to
look to, what is indicated, is getting foreign arbitration, and that's because
one wants to make sure that you have a fair and impartial tribunal.
The reason you want to do that is because the legal risk, we have
sovereign risk, and let's say it is triple B, but it is difficult to say whether
the legal risk, the sovereign rating, the triple B, is a proxy for the legal
rating. We know, in the People's Republic, that they are rated triple B, but
whether the legal system there, or what legal system they do have there for
contract interpretation, for bankruptcy, for security interest, that was wiped
out in 1948, not to reemerge for 35 years, whether you can say with some
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sort of certainty that the legal system there is also triple B. So let's go and
get ourselves some foreign arbitration.
When you go for foreign arbitration, you want to insure that the host
country is a party to the 1958 convention, as well as the (inaudible) of
arbitration. And if you get that, and get all the legal opinions that the
thing is enforceable without reopening the whole thing, the whole dispute
in the host country, than, you know, you have a certain degree of
certainty.
The last thing is, of course, if the project is owned by an entity who
is controlled by the government, that you have an effective waiver of
sovereign immunity. The financing documents, which is the next slide,
there, for the indenture and for the notes, one always goes, if one can, for
New York or English law, those being the two jurisdiction most friendly
to creditors.
Why that is important is because of that little scenario I just put in
before you, that being, if there is an obligation by the issuer to pay in U.S.
dollars, and you have a local law governing clause in the indenture or on
the note, then you have no recompense, and just a big claim in your
malpractice policy probably. If the host country passes a law that says
henceforth all obligations denominated in dollars will be denoted in pecos,
and we supply the control of pecos, which we are printing up like mad,
that is the sort of issue you want to get out of.
The next slide shows what regulatory risk is. These are the sort of
governmental approvals and stuff, export approvals. Here it is interesting.
We haven't had too much experience in Latin America about things like
tax increases and privatization and approvals, but in a deal that we recently
did in the Middle East, it was a large liquid natural gas financing, all the
regulatory risk was subsumed in this gigantic decree by the Emir of Putre,
and he sat down at his desk one day and wrote out that all export
approvals are hereby given, all import approvals are hereby given without
tax or hinderance. You get a tax holiday for 15 years, and we promise
that nothing is going to change, and you are pretty happy with that, except
that, of course, it can all change tomorrow. But you have the decree in
your hand. That's how some of the stuff is handled. Otherwise it's again
by statute, regulation, and the rating agency, if it's doing its job right, will
(inaudible) this sort of stuff down to the ground.
The next slide has to do with environment risk, and that is, even
though a lot of these countries do not have environmental laws to the
extent we do, we pretend that they will, and one looks and tries to jump
through at least a few of the hoops to say, look, we tried, we did the
impact studies, we have the permits and licenses that existed when they
were. You try to get so some of assurance that the project will be
1998]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
grandfathered. And, even so, you get a covenant that they are going to
stay in compliance with the World Bank regulations, which is something.
And you worry a little bit about lender liability. If you foreclose on this
thing that is leaking into the ground, whether your borrowers are going to
be held liable for pollution risk.
So we move on now to project context, and that is, complete with
typographical errors, is a typical project schematic. Equity owning at the
top, off-taking down on the bottom, the input coming in this way, and the
financing coming out on the right.
I would like to talk about are concession agreements. Sometimes it
is easy, and pretty straightforward, to find out if a concession that you are
holding is a nice thing. Columbia, for example, has something called Law
80. Law 80 says that the government, or a particular ministry, can grant
various types of concessions, build, own, operate; build, own, operate,
maintain, transfer, any of these sort of things, and it has been used quite
successfully. Same thing in the Philippines.
In other countries, where concession law, where infrastructural
development has not been part of a master plan by the government, you
wing it a little bit. You try to find some sort of statute. You try to get in
some minister that will tell you that, of course, this is exactly what we
want to do, and we would never, ever think of reneging on a deal.
Nevertheless, you look at how concessions in the past have been
challenged. Who can challenge it, the loser, political foes of the grantor,
such as what happened in the Philippines a few years ago. You try and
look for a closure on the whole idea of whether the concession can be
reopened.
In a particular deal that we are looking at right now in Venezuela, a
mining deal, it was a concession to operate a mine, but it really wasn't a
concession. It was more of a license, and the
license is subject to litigation right now, and one of the reasons we were
having something of a difficult time getting to terms with this deal was
because of, first, the indefinite nature of what was being granted to the
project company, and, also, because of the litigation. Those are the sort
of things we worry about. The tax regime, how it is going to be treated,
of course.
If you have a road deal that depends on, in a country where
maintenance costs are going to escalate, one wants to be able to raise
tariffs without having to wait for a year and go through the political
process to do that. What one wants is some sort of agreement by the state
that tariffs can be raised, and then retroactively approved by the
government, and, if it is not approved, to have some sort of a layoff of
that risk onto the equity or onto some other party. Concession as security.
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One of the things that makes telecommunications deals difficult to project
finance is the fact that you cannot, in many countries, pledge the broadcast
license as effective security, so, basically, you are looking at an unsecured
transaction. It may be under the laws of other countries, as well, that
these things are personal to the project company, and you can't foreclose
on them, or you can't transfer them.
And the last point, again, is what happens if the project company goes
bust, even though you might be able to foreclose on the thing, but if you
want to sell the license or the concession, you might not be able to because
of the transferability thing. I have probably, as Mrs. Bennett in Pride and
Prejudice said, charmed you long enough, so I am just going to finish it
right there. The last to talk about what our criteria are for guaranties, as
well as for intercreditor issues and stuff like that, but it is all pretty much
explained in the handout, and if you have any questions, I would be
delighted to see if I can answer them for you. Thank you very much.
MR. CONE: You certainly carried that off with elegance, grace, charm,
wit, and we are very grateful to you. Those who would like to ask some
questions, you are welcome to do so. I am sure that Sam, Chris and Jim
would be happy to answer them. Does anyone have a question? Paul?
PAUL: I just wonder, in light of all we have discussed, whether now five
or ten years later you can come to an assessment of the whole sovereign
debt crisis and how it was handled, and whether it made this possible, the
mistakes that were made, or how farsighted it was.
MR. SANTOS: My personal opinion is that not enough was done by the
multilaterals, or the government of the United States, to solve that
problem. I think the fact that, in the case of Mexico, they were able to
respond as quickly as they did to solve the problem, prevented a crisis
from occurring. I think that, in the case of debt crisis, a lot could have
been done earlier. I think once it started, it was very difficult to unravel.
I was having a conversation a couple of days ago, and I was basically
saying what would happen if the United States were borrowing yen, and
all of a sudden all the yen loaned were pulled back, had to be paid back
immediately, what would happen to the United States, assuming that all
your borrowing, could we sustain it, and I think probably no. The reality
is everybody pulled out of Latin America at the same time, and it was
very, difficult for Latin America at that juncture to reconstitute itself. A
good example is Chile. Chile had basically started on it privatization
reform a long time before Margaret Thatcher even became a prime
1998]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
minister. (Inaudible) debt crisis, and it had very few loans that were
actually made to government entities. In fact, it was mostly private debt.
So, you know, part of the problem was everything got swept in, bad
address, Latin America was a bad address, nobody wanted to borrow, lend
anybody in those countries, it was swept away, and it was very, very
difficult to resolve it, which is why the situation in Mexico is so important,
that the U.S. Government did something very, very rapidly, invested in
there, and did what they had to do with the World Bank. That's why
when everybody starts criticizing the international community or
(inaudible), they have to take into account that there's very little return to
(inaudible) associations and organizations. What happens if we have
another melt down of some sort, either because financial institutions go
down, or something else happens in the developing world, the emerging
markets, or maybe even one of the major countries, what happens to the
international financial community? There has to be a (inaudible) prove it
could be done in (inaudible).
MR. CONE: Any other questions?
MR. VOICE: Could you say that the amounts into infrastructure is related
to, perhaps, the amount of corruption that goes on in those nations? In
other words, money is going somewhere else, Swiss bank accounts, into
pockets? Latin America is (inaudible) as you mentioned, Asia even worse,
maybe, in terms of the percentage? Here there are more checks and
balances, more goes into the infrastructure?
MR. SANTOS: I didn't quite understand what your question was. Is
there a lot of corruption in Latin America? Maybe a little more than in
some other countries, maybe better than in some parts of Asia. I would
think that that is the case. It is very difficult, you know, to avoid
corruption when the whole structure is basically geared to having
government involved in everything, permits involved in everything you do.
In fact there is a Brazilian saying that basically suggests that you create
regulations so that you can sell facilities. And there is a lot of truth to that.
It sounds good in Portuguese. It doesn't quite translate very nicely in
English. But it basically means if you create enough problems than people
have to get around the problems and that means payoffs to somebody. You
avoid that if you privatize, avoid all those problems associated with getting
a telephone company, or telephone in many countries. You have a 10-year
waiting periods unless you bribe somebody enormously to get a telephone.
You don't have private sector denying service to somebody for 10 years
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that doesn't exist. There is no some such entity, no private entity that
would tolerate that. You have people that are trying to provide a service
and provide it as quickly and earn as much money as possible, but the
overall cost to the society is much less. In fact, one of the things that I
wanted to say, when Bill was talking about why privatization, everybody
talks about the increased costs in tariffs, etcetera. The reality is that the
cost to society of non-privatized entities is much higher than anything that
could be translated in terms of tariff, and, in many instances, tariffs go
down.
In the case Aqua Argentina, which was the privatization of the water
system of Argentina, the tariffs went down by 25 percent after
privatization. This is a company where basically the water system in
Argentina, which was in Buenos Aires, 25 percent of the population was
without water. This is metropolitan area. You had 50 percent of the
water being lost in the system. You had a good portion of the days where
you didn't have enough pressure in the water to get the delivery systems
up, so people were basically putting little pumps on their faucets to suck
the water in. Of course that destroys the integrity of the system, because
the whole system is built on keeping pressure out, to keep out
contamination, so you start sucking in everything from the outside. So
enormous social cost and health hazards. Now, basically, everybody will
be tied into the water, where before you had 95 percent of the water
dumped untreated into the river. Now you will have everything treated.
In many instances, the water was dumped in above intake valves. You had
enormous cost of chemical use. All those costs are down. Not only that,
but you reduce the employees by about two-thirds. The cost of delivering
water to Buenos Aires now is a lot less than it was before. Before it was
basically asking $100 million a year in terms of payments to the water
works, to deliver water in the system. Now it is paying taxes, it is earning
and paying taxes.
So, you know, when you talk about costs, you have to look at not
what is being charged for the water. What you have to determine is what
is the cost of providing that to the society, and you have to put in all the
inputs.
MR. KELLY: The only thing I would add to Sam's comments on your
question is a view from the perspective doing public capital markets deals,
I think you take a long-term look at the effect of these companies going
public is I think it does cause the companies to slowly, it doesn't happen
overnight, but become more mindful of the way they are operated, and the
way their disclosure to the public markets looks. You know, it takes a lot
of work on the part of the bankers and the lawyers, but they do take
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seriously their obligations under the securities laws, and their potential
liability, perhaps, even more important.
Sometimes it is not something as nefarious as, you know, corruption
or payments going, you know, vhere they are not supposed to go, but
keep in mind sometimes a lot of these issuers, unlike in the U.S. markets,
a lot of these are family-run companies that are doing IPOs, and there is
a way that family-run enterprises in this country or Brazil that are run
that's not corrupt, but it is a little loser, the division between what the
corporation is and, you know, Aunt Sally's financing needs happen to be,
it is a little more fluid, and one of the things that is very challenging part
of taking one these company's public is to say there was an old thing that
you ran, but there has to be a new way you run the company, once you
are public in the United States and internationally, and that, you know,
doesn't happen overnight, but it is a change that happens, it changes a lot
of things about the companies, but I think one of the things it does is I
think it makes -- it will not eliminate corruption in these countries, or in
some of these companies, but there is an element of discipline by going
public that's very useful.
And, obviously, one of the key activities that we go about as bankers
and lawyers involved in transactions for bringing a company public is to
do our due diligence, establish a due diligence defense to protect our
investors, and protect our own liability. And it is interesting when you do
that in a Latin context for in a U.S. context it is a going through the
motions pro forma exercise sometimes. In the Latin context you go and the
companies feel almost like they are going before a grand inquisition, and
the bankers and the lawyers are coming in to cross-examine them, and that
always gives us a very warm and fuzzy feeling when they take it that
seriously. I am not suggesting that process ferrets out every skeleton in
the closet or every bit of corruption or so forth, but that, too, has an effect
of causing people to stop and take stock, and whatever the past may have
been, to maybe cast a new light on the way things are. So I think that,
again, over time has a very beneficial. It is one of the beneficial side
effects of the deepening of these (inaudible).
MR. CONE: Any other questions?
Thank you. Thanks very much to the speakers.
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